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The [Constitution] speaks its own importance; comprehending in its consequences, 
nothing less than the existence of the UNION—the safety and welfare of the parts of 
which it is composed—the fate of an empire, in many respects, the most interesting in 
the world. 
  —Alexander Hamilton, 1787 
 
[I] t is impossible not to look forward to distant times, when our rapid multiplication 
will expand itself beyond those limits, and cover the whole northern, if not the southern 
continent, with a people speaking the same language, governed in similar forms, and by 
similar laws; nor can we contemplate with satisfaction either blot or mixture on that 
surface. 
 —Thomas Jefferson, 1809 
 
 
* Associate Professor of Politics, Princeton University. Thanks to Chris Tomlins for providing me 
with the opportunity to present this material at his conference at UC Irvine School of Law in April of 
2010, and to Sean Beienburg, Sara Benson, Michael Burger, Dan Carpenter, Robert Gordon, Mark 
Graber, Dirk Hartog, Jennifer Hochschild, Stefan Heumann, Tom Ogorzalek, Nicholas Parrillo, Jed 
Shugerman, Sarah Staszak, George Steinmetz, Kathy Thelen, Al Tillery, Theo Verinakis, and John 
Witt for very helpful comments on earlier versions of this Article. Lori Speak has done an absolutely 
terrific job editing and preparing the manuscript for copy. 
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[P]ossess it they did, even without a standing army. What can be a stronger proof of 
the security of their possession? And yet by a policy similar to this throughout, was the 
Roman world subdued and held . . . .  
 —Benjamin Franklin, 1760 
 
Where wretched wigwams stood, the miserable abodes of savages, . . . we beheld the 
foundations of cities laid, that in all probability, will rival the greatest upon earth. 
 —Daniel Boone, 17841 
 
During the nation’s beginnings, the idea of “empire” consumed Americans 
both physically and psychologically: Americans declared independence from 
Britain, were surrounded by France and Spain, and frequently spoke of Rome as 
they looked north, south, and west at vast expanses of land.2 In the first decades 
after independence, the initial thirteen states expanded south to the Gulf of 
Mexico and west to the Pacific Ocean. At different moments, political leaders had 
designs for annexing Cuba, Mexico, and other nations in the Caribbean, Latin 
America, and South America, as well as for claiming territory in Western Africa. 
Settlers, business leaders, and politicians quickly bought, sold, and populated 
lands, filibustered nations to the south, policed spheres deemed to be of influence, 
and created and directed trade routes. 
This expansion necessitated a confrontation with an array of populations 
residing on, and claiming ownership of, the land. Hundreds of thousands of 
indigenous people as well as many tens of thousands of European settlers resided 
in these spaces and claimed ownership rights that preexisted the United States. My 
ongoing research is interested in the aspirations of American politicians to create 
 
1. THE FEDERALIST NO. 1, at 1, 1 (Alexander Hamilton) (Andrew Hacker ed., 1964); Letter 
from Thomas Jefferson to Governor Monroe (Nov. 24, 1801), in 4 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS 
JEFFERSON 419, 420 (H.A. Washington ed., New York, Taylor & Maury 1854); BENJAMIN 
FRANKLIN, The Interest of Great Britain Considered with Regard to her Colonies and the Acquisitions of Canada 
and Guadaloupe [sic], in 4 THE WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 32, 74 (Albert Henry Smyth ed., 
Haskell House 1970) (1760). Boone is quoted in PATRICK GRIFFIN, AMERICAN LEVIATHAN: 
EMPIRE, NATION, AND REVOLUTIONARY FRONTIER 179–80 (2007). 
2. See, e.g., ANDY DOOLEN, FUGITIVE EMPIRE: LOCATING EARLY AMERICAN IMPERIALISM 
(2005); NIALL FERGUSON, COLOSSUS: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE AMERICAN EMPIRE (2004); 
DANIEL J. HULSEBOSCH, CONSTITUTING EMPIRE: NEW YORK AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF 
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE ATLANTIC WORLD, 1664–1830 (2005); GARY LAWSON & GUY 
SEIDMAN, THE CONSTITUTION OF EMPIRE: TERRITORIAL EXPANSION AND AMERICAN LEGAL 
HISTORY (2004); PETER S. ONUF, JEFFERSON’S EMPIRE: THE LANGUAGE OF AMERICAN 
NATIONHOOD (2000); AZIZ RANA, THE TWO FACES OF AMERICAN FREEDOM (2010); 
CHRISTOPHER TOMLINS, FREEDOM BOUND: LAW, LABOR, AND CIVIC IDENTITY IN COLONIZING 
ENGLISH AMERICA, 1580–1865 (2010); R.W. VAN ALSTYNE, THE RISING AMERICAN EMPIRE 
(Norton 1974) (1960); Reginald Horsman, The Indian Policy of an “Empire for Liberty,” in NATIVE 
AMERICANS AND THE EARLY REPUBLIC 37 (Frederick E. Hoxie et al. eds., 1999). 
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an empire, the method by which the United States attempted to carry out its goals, 
and the politics of the confrontation between the nation and other peoples. In this 
Article, I provide an overview of three general themes within this broader 
research, with the specific aim of explaining the early outcomes of empire 
building—conquering the land of what now constitutes the forty-eight contiguous 
states, but failing to take further lands, particularly those just south of the 
border—prior to the Civil War. 
The first theme concerns the politics of race. Empire is quintessentially 
about constructing hierarchies between peoples, subordinating one or more 
groups to enrich another; “[t]he nation-state proclaims the commonality of its 
people . . . while the empire-state declares the non-equivalence of multiple 
populations.”3 But American confrontations with nonwhite populations were not 
of one result or outcome. In some places, particularly at the nation’s peripheries, 
confrontations led not just to conquering and expansion but to a surprising 
amount of racial diversity and hybridity; in others, the United States markedly 
slowed down its imperial aspirations when confronted with populations of non-
Europeans that were considered too large to be incorporated into a white 
democratic polity.4 These dynamics were further complicated in that any 
engagement with other peoples—indigenous, African, European, or mestizo—was 
intimately tied to national policy debates about the expansion of slavery into new 
federal territories. Often, the rush to remove Indians in territories such as Kansas 
was intertwined with the desire to create “a dazzling dream of empire” with a 
“slave system triumphant” in the “great western wilderness,” as W.E.B. Du Bois 
so well recounted in John Brown.5 Equally often, the push to annex islands off the 
southern coast of the United States was intertwined with the desire to protect 
slavery and its economy.6 
But imperial activism by the United States cannot solely be explained by the 
politics of slavery and race. Although the belief in a hierarchy of a European race 
held explicitly and implicitly by Americans served both to energize and justify 
continuing national expansion, the nation also needed a means to carry out such 
massive expansion across the continent and beyond. This was most apparent in 
the outright removal of hundreds of thousands of Native Americans from what is 
now the continental United States. Indian removal during the decades before the 
Civil War involved military might and violence, unprecedented commercial 
 
3. JANE BURBANK & FREDERICK COOPER, EMPIRES IN WORLD HISTORY: POWER AND THE 
POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE 8 (2010). See also, e.g., GEORGE M. FREDRICKSON, Colonialism and Racism: 
The United States and South Africa in Comparative Perspective, in THE ARROGANCE OF RACE: HISTORICAL 
PERSPECTIVES ON SLAVERY, RACISM, AND SOCIAL INEQUALITY 216 (1988); EDWARD W. SAID, 
ORIENTALISM (Vintage Books 1979) (1978); Stuart Hall, Race, Articulation, and Societies Structured in 
Dominance, in SOCIOLOGICAL THEORIES: RACE AND COLONIALISM 305 (UNESCO 1980). 
4. See infra notes 30–47. 
5. W.E.B. DU BOIS, JOHN BROWN 70 (David Roediger ed., Modern Library 2001) (1909). 
6. See infra notes 30–47. 
Assembled_Issue_3 v5 (Do Not Delete) 2/22/2012  9:07 AM 
916 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol.  1:3 
 
acquisitions and land taking, the eventual movement of more than a hundred 
thousand people from one home to temporary camps and then to new homes, 
and future colonization.7 The government also used less direct forms of power to 
take indigenous lands: it intentionally destroyed people’s food sources, drew maps 
and surveys to direct the way for hordes of settlers, introduced disease, and used 
trade to create deeply indebted peoples with no option but to sell land on the 
cheap. By 1840, only a few thousand indigenous people were left east of the 
Mississippi, leading Alexis de Tocqueville to remark: “[N]ever has such a 
prodigious development been seen among the nations, nor a destruction so 
rapid.”8 
That the United States accomplished “such a prodigious development” 
suggests a quite powerful American government—or, using the language of 
political science, a powerful American “state”—that was capable of conquering 
thousands of miles of land and removing hundreds of thousands of people. The 
very nature of the word “empire” suggests a powerful state; indeed the Latin 
“imperium,” from which the word is derived, is defined as a supreme power and 
absolute rule, particularly by a state.9 But to suggest this immediately raises a 
conundrum for how we understand the relationship between the American state 
and empire. The American state has always been understood, particularly in its 
earliest years, as “weak”—it consistently struggled to assert authority, capacity, and 
independence and to act concertedly and forcefully on behalf of national goals in 
the face of challenges from a variety of private actors.10 For this reason, scholars 
who study the beginnings of American empire have tended to focus on a later 
time period, after the Civil War, when the government is thought to have finally 
 
7. For just a few of the important studies of this early period of national expansion, see NED 
BLACKHAWK, VIOLENCE OVER THE LAND: INDIANS AND EMPIRES IN THE EARLY AMERICAN 
WEST (2006) (particularly chapters 5–6 ); MICHAEL PAUL ROGIN, FATHERS AND CHILDREN: 
ANDREW JACKSON AND THE SUBJUGATION OF THE AMERICAN INDIAN (Transaction Publishers 
1991) (1975); ALAN TAYLOR, AMERICAN COLONIES (2001); RICHARD WHITE, THE MIDDLE 
GROUND: INDIANS, EMPIRES, AND REPUBLICS IN THE GREAT LAKES REGION, 1650–1815 (1991); 
GRIFFIN, supra note 1. I do not discuss Indian reservations in this Article. For a focus on this period, 
see KEVIN BRUYNEEL, THE THIRD SPACE OF SOVEREIGNTY: THE POSTCOLONIAL POLITICS OF 
U.S.-INDIGENOUS RELATIONS (2007). 
8. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 321 (J.P. Mayer ed., George 
Lawrence trans., Perennial Classics 2000) (1966). 
9. See, e.g., BURBANK & COOPER, supra note 4, at 28. Regarding what constitutes the American 
“state,” see STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, BUILDING A NEW AMERICAN STATE: THE EXPANSION OF 
NATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITIES, 1877–1920 (1982). 
10. See, e.g., RICHARD FRANKLIN BENSEL, YANKEE LEVIATHAN: THE ORIGINS OF 
CENTRAL STATE AUTHORITY IN AMERICA, 1859–1877 (1990); DANIEL P. CARPENTER, THE 
FORGING OF BUREAUCRATIC AUTONOMY: REPUTATIONS, NETWORKS, AND POLICY INNOVATION 
IN EXECUTIVE AGENCIES, 1862–1928 (2001); FAREED ZAKARIA, FROM WEALTH TO POWER: THE 
UNUSUAL ORIGINS OF AMERICA’S WORLD ROLE (1998); Robert O. Keohane, International 
Commitments and American Political Institutions in the Nineteenth Century, in SHAPED BY WAR AND TRADE 
57, 58 (Ira Katznelson & Martin Shefter eds., 2002). 
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developed “vast powers” of military and economic regulatory capacity that 
enabled it to begin ventures into Cuba, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, the Philippines, and 
other island territories off the nation’s coasts.11 
The second theme of the Article, then, is to examine the role of the 
American state in promoting expansion and empire. Conventional understandings 
of the state’s role in expanding across the continent in the antebellum years are in 
keeping with arguments stressing the weakness of the state. Some scholars argue 
that the absence of a strong state was itself consequential as state actors failed to 
slow down rambunctious settlers who continued to take land, declare private wars, 
wage terrorist violence, and engage in reckless capitalist speculations; if empire 
was happening, it was not occurring within the purview of state control. Many 
accounts of these early years emphasize the seemingly unstoppable force of 
European settlement and the drive toward Manifest Destiny. Emblematic here are 
works such as Francis Prucha’s The Great Father, in which the government is 
portrayed as nobly but unsuccessfully trying to slow down the settlers, contain 
their violence, and engage with Native Americans; Michael Rogin’s Fathers and 
Children, in which Andrew Jackson’s actions are merely emblematic of a part of a 
broader societal demand for conquest and liberation; and Patrick Griffin’s 
American Leviathan, which emphasizes the lawlessness of the settlers who were 
often out of the control of whatever few state actors were involved.12 A second 
line of argument suggests that taking Indian lands was, as Niall Ferguson argues, 
“easy;” “the Native American populations were too small and technologically 
backward to offer more than sporadic and ineffectual resistance to the hordes of 
white settlers swarming westward . . . .”13 
My goal is less to refute these accounts—settler society was active, private 
power was powerful, and indigenous populations were often quickly overwhelmed 
as they were thinned by famine, disease, and internal warfare—than to illuminate 
features of state authority that are both frequently overlooked and particularly well 
suited for empire-building. These features of state power are not so much large 
regulatory agencies and militaries, but rather the political and legal control 
exercised over land distribution through the creative use of property laws and the 
ability to move settler populations strategically so that the nation could both 
populate and defend the vast spaces. Land policy and property laws created a 
market for the land, a rationale for taking it from indigenous populations, an 
American population for settling and cultivating it, and a structure for defending 
it. One of the antebellum government’s most significant tasks was distributing and 
 
11. See, e.g., ZAKARIA, supra note 10. 
12. GRIFFIN, supra note 1; FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, THE GREAT FATHER: THE UNITED 
STATES GOVERNMENT AND THE AMERICAN INDIANS (vol. 1 & 2 unabr. prtg. 1995); ROGIN, supra 
note 7. 
13. FERGUSON, supra note 2, at 35. 
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regulating immense amounts of open space. The federal government’s largesse 
with public land, and the legal system it created to distribute this land, was one of 
its most important tools in creating revenue and wielding power and authority 
over states, businesses, and individual settlers. 
The discussion of state capacity as an engine of national expansion and 
empire building, then, emphasizes different features of how political power is 
manifested by a state.14 Land laws replace the need for bureaucracies, and 
settlers—as the epigraph by Benjamin Franklin suggests—replace the need for 
armies. Courts need not create or implement policy reform but need only to help 
perpetuate the legitimacy of specific rules. Federalism—often cited as an obstacle 
to national governing authority—can accelerate the process of expansion by 
setting additional processes in motion so that at least some part of the state is 
always pressing forward, demanding more land. States still represent and exert 
power, and they still have a “monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force 
within a given territory;” but the ways in which they wield this power are more 
dynamic and multifaceted, with incessant piecemeal activity through a plurality of 
mechanisms both national and local so as to enable the power to become, in 
Michel Foucault’s famous words, “capillary.”15 
 
14. Historians and American political development scholars have increasingly emphasized the 
role of the federal government in encouraging land and economic development, as well as the 
methods by which the government frequently harnessed private power for national ends. See, e.g., 
BRIAN BALOGH, A GOVERNMENT OUT OF SIGHT: THE MYSTERY OF NATIONAL AUTHORITY IN 
NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (2009); LAURA JENSEN, PATRIOTS, SETTLERS, AND THE 
ORIGINS OF AMERICAN SOCIAL POLICY (2003); PATRICIA NELSON LIMERICK, THE LEGACY OF 
CONQUEST: THE UNBROKEN PAST OF THE AMERICAN WEST (1987); PETER S. ONUF, STATEHOOD 
AND UNION: A HISTORY OF THE NORTHWEST ORDINANCE (1987); STEPHEN J. ROCKWELL, 
INDIAN AFFAIRS AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY (2010); 
William J. Novak, The Myth of the “Weak” American State, 113 AM. HIST. REV. 752 (2008); Nicholas 
Parrillo, The De-Privatization of American Warfare: How the U.S. Government Used, Regulated, and Ultimately 
Abandoned Privateering in the Nineteenth Century, 19 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1 (2007); Desmond King & 
Robert C. Lieberman, Ironies of State Building: A Comparative Perspective on the American State, 61 WORLD 
POL. 547 (2009) (review essay); Stefan Heumann, The Tutelary Empire: State- and Nation-Building in 
the 19th Century United States (2009) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Univ. of Pa.); Tom Ogorzalek, 
Filibuster Vigilantly: The Liminal State and 19th Century U.S. Expansion (2009) (unpublished manuscript) 
(on file with the author); Ira Katznelson, Flexible Capacity: The Military and Early American Statebuilding, 
in SHAPED BY WAR AND TRADE, supra note 10, at 82. 
15. See Michel Foucault, Two Lectures, in CULTURE/POWER/HISTORY: A READER IN 
CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL THEORY 200, 213 (Nicholas B. Dirks et al. eds., 1994). Max Weber has 
famously defined the state as having a “monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given 
territory.” Max Weber, Politics as a Vocation, in FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 77, 78 
(H.H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills eds. & trans., 1946). The distinctiveness of the state activities I am 
discussing is in keeping with scholarship on comparative empires around the world, which finds that 
the promotion of empire requires a strong state but also one that enables flexibility, resilience, and the 
ability to draw from private power as much as centralized bureaucracies. This is a theme common to 
the comparative study of world empires. See, e.g., KAREN BARKEY, EMPIRE OF DIFFERENCE: THE 
OTTOMANS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (2008); BURBANK & COOPER, supra note 3; J.H. 
ELLIOTT, EMPIRES OF THE ATLANTIC WORLD: BRITAIN AND SPAIN IN AMERICA, 1492–1830 
(2006); J.V. FIFER, THE MASTER BUILDERS: STRUCTURES OF EMPIRE IN THE NEW WORLD (1996); 
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One particularly notable form of state authority, and the third theme of this 
Article, is the legitimating power of law and courts during this time. The Supreme 
Court, most famously in Johnson v. M’Intosh, denied indigenous title to land and 
endorsed American power based importantly in part on the “discovery doctrine” 
that centuries prior was instituted by Catholic and Spanish leaders to rather 
crudely justify European conquest.16 But the real power of the law in promoting 
territorial expansion was not so much through big doctrinal statements by the 
Supreme Court but through federal, state, and local courts consistently privileging 
European-derived common law understandings of sovereignty, capitalism, 
property ownership, and citizenship. “Whites always acquired Indian land within a 
legal framework of their own construction,” a construction that rested on judicial 
and common law rules and institutions that would enable property transactions to 
continually benefit settlers and speculators at the expense of indigenous people.17 
It enabled Americans to conquer “the continent less with violence than with the 
confidence with which they carried forward their notions of constitutional liberty, 
notions forged in the matrix of empire.”18 Particularly in the absence of national 
bureaucracies, it was often courts that were at the forefront of unifying disparate 
territories, providing a basis for capitalist exchange and property distribution, 
extending jurisdiction, and articulating a language through which an imperial 
project could be recognized within broader notions of rights, liberties, and 
property.19 
In the rest of this Article, I use these three themes to organize different 
contours of America’s expansionist and imperialist project. But while I separate 
the themes for organizational purposes, they are obviously deeply intertwined with 
each other. The American state took shape in the midst of severe racial divisions; 
slavery in particular impacted constitutional design, political representation, and 
limits for national governing authority. In turn, state design had long term 
consequences for the racial makeup of the United States, as constitutionally 
entrenched forms of political representation would prove repeatedly consequential 
 
MICHAEL HARDT & ANTONIO NEGRI, EMPIRE (2000); MICHAEL MANN, 1 THE SOURCES OF 
SOCIAL POWER: A HISTORY OF POWER FROM THE BEGINNING TO A.D. 1760, at 130–78 (1986); 
SETTLER COLONIALISM IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY: PROJECTS, PRACTICES, LEGACIES (Caroline 
Elkins & Susan Pedersen eds., 2005); GEORGE STEINMETZ, THE DEVIL’S HANDWRITING: 
PRECOLONIALITY AND THE GERMAN COLONIAL STATE IN QINGDAO, SAMOA, AND SOUTHWEST 
AFRICA (2007). 
16. Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543 (1823). 
17. STUART BANNER, HOW THE INDIANS LOST THEIR LAND: LAW AND POWER ON THE 
FRONTIER 4 (2005). 
18. HULSEBOSCH, supra note 2, at 11. 
19. See, e.g., LAUREN BENTON, A SEARCH FOR SOVEREIGNTY: LAW AND GEOGRAPHY IN 
EUROPEAN EMPIRES, 1400–1900 (2010); LAUREN BENTON, LAW AND COLONIAL CULTURES: 
LEGAL REGIMES IN WORLD HISTORY, 1400–1900 (2002); SKOWRONEK, supra note 9, at 19–36; 
John Fabian Witt, Anglo-American Empire and the Crisis of the Legal Frame (Will the Real British Empire 
Please Stand Up?), 120 HARV. L. REV. 754 (2007) (review essay). 
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in shaping political efforts at territorial expansion. Finally, I emphasize “law” as a 
theme in an effort to highlight its particular importance, as well as to comment on 
an important irony; if there was one branch of government that, given its 
predispositions, ought to have protected indigenous property rights, quite arguably 
it should have been the Supreme Court. That the Court came to embrace settler 
populism over the property and sovereignty claims of Native peoples reflects how 
it too was importantly limited by its own readings of race and racial hierarchies.20 
I. RACE AND AMERICAN EXPANSION: INCORPORATING VERSUS REMOVING 
In the first half of the nineteenth century, the territory of the United States 
more than tripled in size (Figure 1). Peace with Great Britain in 1783 gave the 
United States territory from the Atlantic Ocean to the Mississippi River and from 
the Great Lakes to the southern boundary of Georgia, which amounted to 531 
million acres. From there, possession of what would eventually become the 
continental United States took place in two distinct phases. The first involved 
treaties, state cessions, and armed conquest led both by national leaders and local 
settlers. The United States bought the Louisiana Territory from France in 1803; 
with more than 756 million acres of land, this land acquisition alone just about 
doubled the size of the United States. Another 38 million acres came in 1819 with 
the acquisition of Florida, a taking that resulted from federal and local assertion 
and a short war with Spain and Britain. Soon after, nearly 340 million acres were 
added to the nation after the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo in 1848, including 
lands that are now California, Nevada, Utah, Arizona, and parts of New Mexico 





20. See, e.g., RANA, supra note 2 at 106–08; ROGERS M. SMITH, CIVIC IDEALS: CONFLICTING 
VISIONS OF CITIZENSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY (1997). 
21. THOMAS DONALDSON, THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 13 (Washington, Government Printing 
Office 1880). 
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All of these lands, as well as the territory of the original thirteen states, 
were acquired from entities the United States recognized as nation-states—most 
notably Britain, France, Spain, and Mexico. But none of these lands were empty 
and, although the nation would immediately assert sovereignty over the land based 
on its treaties with the triad of European empires, such assertions did not mean 
there was consent or transfer of property rights from those who inhabited the 
land. Indigenous populations were the largest group that inhabited these lands. 
Scholars, federal government agencies such as the Office of Indian Affairs, and 
recent anthropological estimates have fairly consistently placed the number of 
indigenous people at around six hundred thousand.22 Other populations also 
claimed ownership and possession of the land. When the United States acquired 
Louisiana, it included a population of roughly forty thousand French settlers, as 
well as smaller numbers of Spanish, Irish, and West Indians.23 Acquisition of 
Spanish Florida added another twenty thousand people including about five 
thousand Seminoles and a significant free black population.24 The Treaty of 
Guadalupe Hidalgo in 1848 involved land that included more than one hundred 
thousand Mexicans, and acquisitions of parts of New Mexico led to an additional 
 
22. See PAUL STUART, NATIONS WITHIN A NATION: HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF AMERICAN 
INDIANS 52 (1987); RUSSELL THORNTON, AMERICAN INDIAN HOLOCAUST AND SURVIVAL: A 
POPULATION HISTORY SINCE 1492, at 43 (1990). For discussion of the debate regarding an accurate 
estimate of Native American populations, see C. MATTHEW SNIPP, AMERICAN INDIANS: THE FIRST 
OF THIS LAND 1–25 (1989). 
23. LEWIS WILLIAM NEWTON, THE AMERICANIZATION OF FRENCH LOUISIANA: A STUDY 
OF THE PROCESS OF ADJUSTMENT BETWEEN THE FRENCH AND THE ANGLO-AMERICAN 
POPULATIONS OF LOUISIANA, 1803–1860, at 4 (Arno Press 1980) (1929). 
24. D.W. MEINIG, 2 THE SHAPING OF AMERICA: A GEOGRAPHICAL PERSPECTIVE ON 500 
YEARS OF HISTORY, CONTINENTAL AMERICA 1800–1867, at 31–32 (1993). 
Assembled_Issue_3 v5 (Do Not Delete) 2/22/2012  9:07 AM 
922 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol.  1:3 
 
sixty thousand Mexicans and seventy thousand indigenous people.25 Engagement 
with and incorporation of these different populations, whether French, Mexican, 
Creole, or Pueblo, created fundamental issues of incorporating varied religions, 
languages, legal structures, labor practices, gender relationships, and politics.26 
This confrontation with a multitude of racial groups also forced aspiring 
empire-builders, settlers, and indigenous populations to reevaluate their own 
ideologies and understandings of race. Many people on and around the North 
American continent had not developed deeply thought-out ideas about the 
meaning and reality of race “until they encountered its plurality . . . .”27 The 
outcome of this political, social, and intellectual inquiry was quite varied and 
complicates conventional accounts of both racial formation and the notion of 
racial orders in the development of an American people.28 It also complicates the 
way in which we often attribute racism either to driving or limiting the nation’s 
imperial aspirations.29 There is no one constant or unifying story here, and the 
 
25. Kevin Bruyneel, Hierarchy and Hybridity: The Internal Postcolonialism of Mid-Nineteenth-Century 
American Expansionism, in RACE AND AMERICAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 106, 107 (Joseph 
Lowndes et al. eds., 2008); Laura E. Gómez, Race, Colonialism, and Criminal Law: Mexicans and the 
American Criminal Justice System in Territorial New Mexico, 34 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 1129, 1139–40 (2000). 
26. See, e.g., EMPIRE AND OTHERS: BRITISH ENCOUNTERS WITH INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, 
1600–1850 (Martin Daunton & Rick Halpern eds., 1999); JULIE ROY JEFFREY, FRONTIER WOMEN 
(rev. ed. 1979); ANDRÉS RESÉNDEZ, CHANGING NATIONAL IDENTITIES AT THE FRONTIER: TEXAS 
AND NEW MEXICO, 1800–1850 (2005); RACHEL ST. JOHN, LINE IN THE SAND: A HISTORY OF THE 
U.S.-MEXICO BORDER (2011); Jeremy Adelman & Stephen Aron, From Borderlands to Borders: Empires, 
Nation-States, and the Peoples in Between in North American History, 104 AM. HIST. REV. 814 (1999); John 
Mack Faragher, “More Motley Than Mackinaw”: From Ethnic Mixing to Ethnic Cleansing on the Frontier of the 
Lower Missouri, 1783–1833, in CONTACT POINTS: AMERICAN FRONTIERS FROM THE MOHAWK 
VALLEY TO THE MISSISSIPPI, 1750–1830, at 304–26 (Andrew R.L. Cayton & Fredrika J. Teute eds., 
1998). Culinary differences were also a boundary to overcome, as indicated by one army engineer’s 
initial survey into Pueblo territory in New Mexico where he encountered “the Mexican tortilla”: 
“although I was excessively hungry, it did not fail to leave at the stomach a slight sensation of nausea. 
When folded and rolled together, it does not look unlike (particularly that made from the blue corn) a 
‘hornet’s nest’—a name by which it is sometimes called.” J.H. Simpson, The Report of Lieutenant J.H. 
Simpson of an Expedition into the Navajo Country in 1849, in REPORTS OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR 55, 62 
(Washington, Union Office 1850). 
27. UDAY SINGH MEHTA, LIBERALISM AND EMPIRE: A STUDY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY 
BRITISH LIBERAL THOUGHT 15 (1999). Mehta’s quote refers specifically to imperial elites. For 
discussions of how broader populations also participated in learning about race, see, for example, 
GEORGE REID ANDREWS, AFRO-LATIN AMERICA, 1800–2000 (2004); JULIAN GO, AMERICAN 
EMPIRE AND THE POLITICS OF MEANING (2008); MATTHEW FRYE JACOBSON, BARBARIAN 
VIRTUES: THE UNITED STATES ENCOUNTERS FOREIGN PEOPLES AT HOME AND ABROAD, 1876–
1917 (2000); PETER SILVER, OUR SAVAGE NEIGHBORS: HOW INDIAN WAR TRANSFORMED EARLY 
AMERICA (2008); Adelman & Aron, supra note 26. 
28. Generally on the idea of racial formation and racial orders, see, for example, ANTHONY 
W. MARX, MAKING RACE AND NATION (1998); MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL 
FORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES: FROM THE 1960S TO THE 1990S (2d ed. 1994); Desmond S. 
King and Rogers M. Smith, Racial Orders in American Political Development, 99 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 75 
(2005). 
29. For the important argument that imperial aspirations were driven and energized by 
feelings of racial superiority, see, for example, REGINALD HORSMAN, RACE AND MANIFEST 
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details reflect simultaneously the important ways in which American 
understandings of racial hierarchies were very much in flux and the ways in which 
politics of the state intervened to skew toward a specific set of outcomes.30 
First, there was a surprising amount of multiracial diversity and hybridity, 
particularly in personal relationships and at geographic borderlands such as New 
Orleans, New Mexico, and Oklahoma. This forced empire builders into fierce 
deliberations over the meaning of these interracial dynamics for the future of 
American democracy and racial identity.31 Sometimes, political leaders assumed 
that white settlements would overwhelm fears of racial diversity becoming 
hegemonic. The lack of sufficient numbers of American settlers was a consistent 
problem that limited empire building as often as it encouraged it.32 The United 
States could take Texas and other parts of Mexico only if few Mexicans resided on 
the land; further efforts to annex Cuba, the Dominican Republic, and other areas 
south of the continental United States (and later regions in the South Pacific) were 
consistently slowed by fears of incorporating non-Europeans.33 Unless the United 
States felt safe that there were sufficient American (and at the time, this was 
equivalent to “white”) majorities, it held off moving forward with annexation or at 
least, as the long sagas with Hawaii and New Mexico represented, it kept the 
territory and its people in a status below state and citizen. At other times, 
American politicians chose not to annex or incorporate lands because they feared 
that political and population transformations happening domestically in those 
lands made the possibility of maintaining white majorities precarious. In Cuba, for 
instance, higher rates of racial miscegenation led Americans, who otherwise 
supported the annexation of the island on the grounds that its white population 
was large enough to dominate the extension of democracy to the island, to rise up 
in opposition out of fear that the white ruling class in the country was too 
unstable, too willing to mix with other racial groups, and thus, was a threat to 
existing American racial boundaries. 
 
DESTINY: THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN RACIAL ANGLO-SAXONISM (1981); ROGIN, supra note 8. For 
an equally important claim that race constrained national expansion, see, for example, ERIC T.L. 
LOVE, RACE OVER EMPIRE: RACISM & U.S. IMPERIALISM, 1865–1900 (2004). 
30. I pursue this argument in more detail in Paul Frymer, Imperial Aspirations and Racial 
Formation in Antebellum America (2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the author). 
31. Adelman & Aron, supra note 26. 
32. A noted exception to this pattern was in the Deep South where African slaves typically 
outnumbered white citizens. No doubt interrelated to this exception, this area was, as David Adams 
writes, “an armed camp” to enforce slavery during these years. There were at least 250 slave revolts, 
and 11 federal military companies were involved in preventing Nat Turner’s rebellion in Virginia. 
David Adams, Internal Military Intervention in the United States, 32 J. PEACE RES. 197, 198–99 (1995). 
33.  Later debates about statehood for Hawaii followed similar themes, as Americans waited 
for a moment when the American population was large enough to form a “democratic” majority over 
native Hawaiians and Japanese. See, e.g., SALLY ENGLE MERRY, COLONIZING HAWAI’I: THE 
CULTURAL POWER OF LAW (2000); LOVE, supra note 29, at 73–158 (2004). 
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More than anything else, the specter and politics of slavery hovered over 
any form of American expansion and any discussion of how to conceptualize, 
intellectualize, or live race.34 Divisions in the nation and in government over 
slavery dominated discussions about national expansion, whether it involved 
expanding to Canada or Cuba. For instance, the drive to maintain slavery 
frequently led slave owners in the South to support acquiring territories with large 
African and Afro-Latin populations (both slave and free).35 Of course, these 
southern slave supporters only wanted incorporation of the islands as a way to 
maintain the existence of slavery in the United States; but had they succeeded in 
achieving their short-term political goals, the long-term racial geography of the 
United States, and the eventual scope of its imperial conquest, would quite likely 
have looked far different. Meanwhile, the success of the slave revolution in Haiti 
at the turn of the nineteenth century led President Jefferson—out of fear that a 
free Haiti would threaten American slave interests—to reach out to the French 
and encourage their maintenance of a military presence in New Orleans. The 
French declined; but had they agreed, it would have made the possibility of a 
future United States acquisition of the Louisiana territory far less likely, and thus 
would have significantly shaped the future of American expansion.36 
When the nation did expand, the existence of significant nonwhite 
populations heightened fears in the United States that the maintenance of the 
nation’s white majority was at risk. From Thomas Jefferson to national 
geographers to the heads of the nation’s Census bureaus, maintaining white 
majorities was an ever-present concern.37 From early on, then, the United States’ 
following of the Roman model of citizen expansion took place with a racially 
hierarchical tinge, with both the continuing presence of slavery in new territories 
as well as the passage of the Naturalization Act of 1790 providing statutory 
confirmation that naturalization for new immigrants was only open to free white 
persons.38 Perceptions of whiteness eased the opportunities for non-British 
 
34. See, e.g., Jed Handelsman Shugerman, The Louisiana Purchase and South Carolina’s Reopening of 
the Slave Trade in 1803, 22 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 263 (2002); Michael Zuckerman, The Color of 
Counterrevolution: Thomas Jefferson and the Rebellion in San Domingo, QUADERNI ONLINE: QUADERNO II, 
THE LANGUAGES OF REVOLUTION 83 (http://www.library.vanderbilt.edu/Quaderno/Quaderno2/ 
quaderno2.html); MEINIG, supra note 24, at 154–58. See also, JOHN SLIDELL, MAKING 
APPROPRIATIONS TO FACILITATE THE ACQUISITION OF THE ISLAND OF CUBA, S. REP. NO. 35–351 
(1859); WILLIAM W. FREEHLING, The Complex Career of Slaveholder Expansionism, in THE 
REINTEGRATION OF AMERICAN HISTORY: SLAVERY AND THE CIVIL WAR 158 (1994). 
35. Notably, see ROBERT E. MAY, THE SOUTHERN DREAM OF A CARIBBEAN EMPIRE 1854–
1861 (1973). 
36. See, e.g., THE IMPACT OF THE HAITIAN REVOLUTION IN THE ATLANTIC WORLD (David 
Patrick Geggus ed., 2001); Zuckerman, supra note 34. 
37. See, e.g., J.D.B. DeBow, STATISTICAL VIEW OF THE UNITED STATES 45 (Washington, 
Senate Printer 1854) (with tables entitled White Population of the United States, and Increase of the Whites). 
On the notion of “whiteness” more broadly, see DAVID ROEDIGER, THE WAGES OF WHITENESS: 
RACE AND THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN WORKING CLASS (rev. ed. 2007). 
38. See RONALD T. TAKAKI, IRON CAGES: RACE AND CULTURE IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY 
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European settlers despite the great potential for fear and incompatibility. Despite 
tensions that resulted from German, Polish, and other European immigrants 
arriving on the continent, the United States consistently granted legal and political 
protections to these settlers. When courts and administrators dealt with land 
disputes between American citizens and Spanish, French, Mexican, and British 
citizens, there were consistent references to the legal foundations of those 
countries as a reference point for sorting out claims.39 When the United States 
purchased the Louisiana Territory in 1803, the resident French population was 
given statehood and citizenship rights within a decade despite the fact that 
“Louisiana was an imperial colony of alien people,” who spoke a different 
language, preferred a different style of government, practiced a different religion, 
followed a different form of law, and had very different views of individualism, 
racial and gender roles, and culture.40 
Decades later, the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo notably provided 
citizenship rights to Mexican and Spanish citizens residing in the area being 
transferred from Mexico to the United States.41 There was far more public 
concern here, more so than with the granting of citizenship rights to the French of 
Louisiana: Senator Lewis Cass from Michigan argued in Congress that the United 
States does “not want the people of Mexico, either as citizens or subjects. All we 
want is a portion of territory, which they nominally hold, generally uninhabited, 
or, where inhabited at all, sparsely so, and with a population, which would soon 
recede, or identify itself with ours.”42 Senator John C. Calhoun feared that “[t]o 
incorporate Mexico, would be the very first instance of the kind of incorporating 
an Indian race; for more than half of the Mexicans are Indians, and the other is 
composed chiefly of mixed tribes . . . . Ours, sir, is the Government of a white 
race.”43 The Polk Administration responded accordingly; it claimed land that was 
largely unpopulated, calculating carefully in peace discussions with Mexico how to 
draw the line between the two nations so as to leave with Mexico the land that 
held the majority of settled areas. Polk and Congress also agreed to strike Title 
X—which had explicitly protected preexisting legal status of Mexican property 
 
AMERICA 14–15 (Oxford Univ. Press 2000) (1979). 
39. See, e.g., 13 THE TERRITORIAL PAPERS OF THE UNITED STATES: THE TERRITORY OF 
LOUISIANA-MISSOURI, 1803–1806, at 319 (Clarence Edwin Carter ed., 1948); Paul Gates, The 
California Land Act of 1851, 50 CAL. HIST. Q. 395 (1971). 
40. MEINIG, supra note 24, at 15. 
41. Kevin Bruyneel well points out that this was not simply a granting of equal citizenship, but 
an offer of citizenship to a population that had little choice given the “rapidly and radically altered 
political, cultural, and racial context . . . .” Bruyneel, supra note 25, at 113. See also SMITH, supra note 
20, at 181–85. Moreover, some of these people subsequently lost important democratic rights after 
state legislators passed laws denying rights such as the vote, the right to a trial and jury, and so forth. 
See, e.g., MARÍA E. MONTOYA, TRANSLATING PROPERTY: THE MAXWELL LAND GRANT AND THE 
CONFLICT OVER LAND IN THE AMERICAN WEST, 1840–1900 ch. 5 (2002); Gómez, supra note 25. 
42. CONG. GLOBE, 29TH CONG., 2D SESS. 369 (1847). 
43. CONG. GLOBE, 30TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 98 (1848). 
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rights—from the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. Without Title X protections, 
people who found themselves newly Mexican-Americans also found that their 
property claims were dependent entirely on U.S. courts; numerous studies have 
found that Mexicans did not fair well in these courts, losing the predominant 
number of property claims to white settlers.44 Unlike the French-Louisianans, 
those Mexicans who did reside in areas of land that were turned over to the 
United States found their opportunities to maintain citizenship and property rights 
to be quite varied, and again fairly dependent on the size of their population vis-à-
vis American settlers. Where Mexican populations were largest, such as in New 
Mexico, their rights remained most durable; in places where they found American 
settlers overwhelming them with greater numbers, such as Texas, their rights were 
more quickly seized as, despite the granting of official U.S. citizenship rights, a 
number of states passed laws that discriminated against Mexican populations and 
relied on land commissions and courts to extinguish their property rights. In still 
other areas, the multifaceted nature of the state’s different racial histories often 
placed people of Mexican ancestry in the middle of racial hierarchies in between 
whites and Europeans on one side, and Indians and blacks on the other.45 
Before the United States expanded to Louisiana and through parts of 
Mexico, it had confrontations with indigenous populations residing on the eastern 
side of the Mississippi River. Unlike the treatment of significant portions of the 
people residing in areas of Louisiana, Mexico, and Cuba, American treatment of 
Native Indians was exceptional both in that American expansion was only slowed 
briefly by their presence on the land and discussions of incorporation and 
assimilation were never seriously considered. When the United States purchased 
lands from the French, as we saw above, the assumption was that American 
settlers would intermix and assimilate the French populations that remained. In 
contrast, lands that held indigenous people were often thought not to have 
populations at all. Many Europeans subscribed to the Roman legal principle res 
nullius, which held that “empty” land remains common property until put to use; 
the first to appropriately use the land became the owner. Early charters of colonies 
such as Virginia and Georgia claimed vast expanses of land that stretched from 
the eastern coastline to the western coastline; Massachusetts claimed land to the 
west coast on condition that it was not actually “possessed or inhabited by any 
other Christian Prince or State.”46 This followed important strands of British and 
Spanish colonial political and legal thought that legitimated conquest of a 
population of people deemed to be savages and “others,” enabling the British (and 
 
44. See, e.g., TOMÁS ALMAGUER, RACIAL FAULT LINES: THE HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF 
WHITE SUPREMACY IN CALIFORNIA ch. 3 (2d ed. 2009); MONTOYA, supra note 41; Bruyneel, supra 
note 25. 
45. ALMAGUER, supra note 44; RESÉNDEZ, supra note 26. 
46. LISA FORD, SETTLER SOVEREIGNTY: JURISDICTION AND INDIGENOUS PEOPLE IN 
AMERICA AND AUSTRALIA, 1788–1836, at 16 (2010). 
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as we will see, later the Americans) to take land with only sporadic thought to the 
rights of those inhabiting it.47 Perhaps most notable in this vein is chapter V of 
John Locke’s Second Treatise of Government, which portrayed American geography as 
a vast vacant space because it did not have farmers who cultivated the land, in 
contrast to Indians who were products of nature, not entitled to own property that 
they did not properly use.48 Locke, like other leading British theorists at the time, 
learned about British Empire from personal experience working in numerous 
government jobs in the American colonies and writing an early constitution for 
the Carolina colony. As David Armitage writes, no “figure played as prominent a 
role in the institutional history of European colonialism before James Mill and 
John Stuart Mill joined the administration of the East India Company.”49 Locke’s 
argument that indigenous populations, as well as African slaves, were reduced to a 
state of nature justified the view that these populations were not worthy of human 
rights.50 
This sentiment was not uniform among American leaders, even if it was 
importantly hegemonic. There were debates about whether indigenous people 
would be treated equally as individuals and their communities as nations, as well as 
movements to civilize and assimilate them into American culture.51 There were 
also meaningful debates about granting U.S. citizenship rights and statehood to 
indigenous populations. At least some American political leaders supported 
providing Native Americans with the opportunity to follow the procedures of the 
Northwest Ordinance and create an American territory with the idea of eventually 
becoming a state; there were moments in both national and state treaties with 
Indian nations that led to opportunities for Native Americans to become 
American citizens.52 Article VI of the Treaty with the Delawares at Fort Pitt in 
 
47. Specific to British articulations about the conquest of America, see Christopher Tomlins, 
In a Wilderness of Tigers: Violence, the Discourse of English Colonizing, and the Refusals of American History, 4 
THEORETICAL INQ. L. 451 (2003). For a variety of discussions on both the racism and complexity 
within British colonial thought, see MEHTA, supra note 27; SAID, supra note 3; Hall, supra note 3. 
48. See David Armitage, John Locke, Carolina, and the Two Treatises of Government, 32 POL. 
THEORY 602 (2004); MEHTA, supra note 27, at 123–32; RANA, supra note 2, at 33–37. 
49. Armitage, supra note 48, at 603. 
50. This racialized thought was not limited to England. George Fredrickson has argued that 
the distinction was between “Christian” and “heathen,” reflecting “the religious militancy nurtured by 
the long and bitter struggle for supremacy in the Mediterranean between Christian and Islamic 
civilizations. . . . [T]he Pope authorized the enslavement and seizures of lands and property of ‘all 
saracens and pagans whatsoever, and all other enemies of Christ . . . .’” GEORGE M. FREDRICKSON, 
WHITE SUPREMACY: A COMPARATIVE STUDY IN AMERICAN AND SOUTH AFRICAN HISTORY 7–8 
(1981). See also ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL THOUGHT: 
THE DISCOURSES OF CONQUEST 13–118 (1990). 
51. Notably, regarding political thought at the time, see ROGIN, supra note 7; TAKAKI, supra 
note 38; ANTHONY F.C. WALLACE, JEFFERSON AND THE INDIANS: THE TRAGIC FATE OF THE 
FIRST AMERICANS (1999). 
52. Regarding support for an Indian American territory, presumably with the future 
opportunity under the laws of the Northwest Ordinance to eventually create a state, see Annie H. 
Abel, Proposals for an Indian State, 1778–1878, in 1 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE AMERICAN HISTORICAL 
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1778 permitted the Delawares and “any other tribes, who have been friends of the 
United States, to join the present confederation, and to form a State, whereof the 
Delaware nation shall be the head, and have a representation in Congress.” The 
Treaty of Hopewell in 1785 with the Cherokees provided similar language 
declaring in order “that the Indians may have full confidence in the justice of the 
United States, respecting their interests, they shall have the right to send a deputy, 
of their choice, whenever they see fit, to Congress.” Thomas Jefferson 
subsequently told Delaware tribal leaders that once they came to believe in and 
accept private property, they would find themselves wanting to “form one people 
with us, and we shall all be Americans. You will mix with us by marriage. Your 
blood will run in our veins and will spread with us over this great island.”53 
Even as the policy for Indian removal accelerated in the late 1820s, there 
remained opportunities—at least officially stated opportunities—for specific 
indigenous populations to obtain American citizenship. Multiple treaties with the 
Choctaws in Mississippi, such as the Treaty of Doak’s Stand in 1820 and the 
Treaty of Dancing Rabbit Creek in 1831, provided that any Choctaw who elected 
not to move westward with the Choctaw Nation could become an American 
citizen if he stayed on designated lands for five years after treaty ratification. 
Scholars tend to treat these distinctions with a healthy amount of dubiousness,54 
but such distinctions had at least some legal meaning and were sometimes 
enforced by courts even in surprising settings.55 Even Chief Justice Taney’s 
thoughts of the possibility of Native American citizenship as opposed to African 
American citizenship were striking in the otherwise ignominious decision of Dred 
Scott v. Sanford. Taney argued that although indigenous people 
were uncivilized, they were yet a free and independent people, associated 
together in nations or tribes, and governed by their own laws . . . . [T]hey 
may, without doubt, like the subjects of any other foreign Government, 
be naturalized by the authority of Congress, and become citizens of a 
State, and of the United States; and if an individual should leave his 
nation or tribe, and take up his abode among the white population, he 
would be entitled to all the rights and privileges which would belong to 
an emigrant from any other foreign people.56 
 
ASSOCIATION FOR THE YEAR 1907, at 87 (1908); JEDEDIAH MORSE, A REPORT TO THE SECRETARY 
OF WAR OF THE UNITED STATES ON INDIAN AFFAIRS (Augustus M. Kelley 1970) (1822). 
53. Quoted in WHITE, supra note 7, at 474. 
54. See, e.g., SMITH, supra note 20, at 183. 
55. See, e.g., McIntosh v. Cleveland, 15 Tenn. 46 (Tenn. Err. & App. 1834) (upholding the 
property rights of a Cherokee who had been driven from his home during the process of Cherokee 
removal since it did not constitute a voluntary removal, and he himself had become a citizen of 
Tennessee and resided on land outside of Cherokee lands); Jones’ Lessee v Evans, 13 Tenn. 323, 328 
(Tenn. Err. & App. 1833) (holding that Indians have opportunities in treaties to become citizens of 
the United States, and their property rights should not be taken away if they so choose to do it). 
56. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 403–04 (1857). 
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These debates would continue past the Civil War to the debates over 
Oklahoma and Sequoia statehood at the end of the century. but the lost 
possibilities and potentials are just that. Despite sometimes meaningful debates 
about the place that indigenous populations could have as equal partners in an 
expanding American nation, and the often significant efforts of Indian 
populations in shaping their own identity and future, the bulk of the history of the 
nineteenth century would continue a course of removal and eradication.57 Since 
the United States decided not to incorporate indigenous populations into its 
polity, the next part of the story of American expansion involves some of the 
methods by which the land was taken, particularly in forms that could be 
legitimated in a state without extensive powers and within a nation that was 
attached to a deep-seated discourse of liberal individual rights. I turn in the rest of 
this essay to some of the processes by which the American state would carry out 
this twin process of expansion and eradication. 
II. LAND POLICY AND STATE AUTHORITY 
By the time of formal Indian removal in the 1820s and ‘30s, the numbers 
of American settlers overwhelmed the indigenous populations remaining east of 
the Mississippi. But at the nation’s inception, the balance was closer and hence, 
there were many purely strategic and political reasons why the U.S. government 
needed to negotiate with indigenous populations. In early years, Indian nations 
were in important alliances with other European empires, strengthening their hand 
against the new nation and, at times, strengthening the hand of the United States 
against rivals.58 Moreover, Native populations were important economic 
middlemen between colonial buyers and sellers of land. Individuals and land 
companies who bought land from Native Americans wanted such transactions 
granted in legal and political dealings; otherwise, their purchases were illegitimate. 
Numerous land companies, despite repeated government prohibitions, bought 
land from Indian tribes with the hopes of winning later in court or winning a 
preemption grant from the federal government. Finally, the numbers of 
indigenous people were particularly sizeable in many areas where Americans 
wanted to expand. The state of Georgia would repeatedly find itself at the center 
of Indian removal efforts in part because so much of potential state territorial 
expansion was limited by Cherokee, Creek, and other indigenous nations living on 
their borders. As the United States negotiated the Northwest Territory from 
Virginia, further swaths of frontier land populated by Indian nations presented 
issues for expansion. 
 
57. Regarding the ways in which Indians importantly structured their own identities, see 
SILVER, supra note 27; WHITE, supra note 7. 
58. In particular, see WHITE, supra note 7. 
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Because neither the British nor the early United States were in a position 
to immediately dominate the progression of land disputes, both nations either paid 
for Indian land or negotiated with indigenous nations in a way that recognized a 
notable degree of independent sovereignty.59 The British initially adopted policies 
of coexistence with Native American nations because of their sense that they 
lacked the political resources to carry out expansion. The British stationed a mere 
seven companies of seventy-five men each to regions in the West (Ohio, 
Michigan, Kentucky), numbers that would never be able to control the vast 
regions. After the victory over the French in the Seven Years’ War in 1763, the 
British established the initial boundaries of the American colony between British 
settlements and Indian nations, following generally along the western side of the 
Appalachian mountains, incorporating South Carolina on the north through all 
but the most western parts of Pennsylvania and splitting New York in half.60 In 
that year, the British decided to give up on claiming territory—although 
maintaining the assertion of sovereignty—that was west of the dividing line. As 
Patrick Griffin suggests, “[T]he royal proclamation seemed to provide for an 
empire on the cheap, revealing from the outset a British failure of will to make 
good on what was promulgated on paper.”61 
Confusion about land rights had reigned over the last years of the British 
colonies and the early years of the American republic. The thirteen British 
colonies participated in different ways and at different speeds in adjudicating these 
conflicts and were often inconsistent with each other in understanding jurisdiction 
and occupancy rights. Colonies were dealing with situations where delineated 
boundaries were confusing, numerous groups—from empires to colonies to large 
land companies to individual settlers—were claiming property rights, and both 
squatting and corruption were common. Moreover, all of the colonies were 
making their own land deals, whether for financial profit or to encourage 
settlement through headright systems. Because most of the land on the continent 
had been neither explored by the British nor entirely understood, individual states 
often made grandiose claims of sovereignty. As mentioned earlier, numerous 
states asserted title to all of the land going far west, even to the Pacific Ocean, and 
states such as Connecticut—after discovering that Pennsylvania had formed its 
own colony on land that Connecticut claimed by charter—turned further west to 
find land available for transplanting their own surplus of citizens.62 
The activities of squatters, traders, and speculators led an increasing 
number of settlers to claim territory for themselves, and began to put pressure on 
 
59. BANNER, supra note 17, at ch. 2; FORD, supra note 46, at 19. 
60. GRIFFIN, supra note 1, at 25. 
61. Id. 
62. Paul Moyer, “Real” Indians, “White” Indians, and the Contest for the Wyoming Valley, in FRIENDS 
AND ENEMIES IN PENN’S WOODS: INDIANS, COLONISTS, AND THE RACIAL CONSTRUCTION OF 
PENNSYLVANIA 221 (William A. Pencak & Daniel K. Richter eds., 2004). 
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the British government for a change in policy. British law forbade giving legal title 
to those settlers who were making deals with indigenous peoples, but this did not 
stop speculators from making local level deals with whomever they could find that 
could arguably lay a claim to having ownership of the land, and hence the 
authority to sell the land to the settler. Settlers and speculators believed that they 
would have the best claim to the property once the British revoked their own 
policy of forbidding land sales. Since property law legitimated the possessor of the 
“best claim” to land, as opposed to a certainty of legal possession, speculation and 
squatting ran amok with individuals hoping to put themselves in the best position 
to claim land once it was legally available. George Washington was among those 
who recognized the abundant opportunities for land speculation: responding in 
1767 to one wealthy Virginian speculator, Washington asked for help in acquiring 
“a good deal of land,” suggesting to the speculator that the Proclamation 
prohibiting land purchases was nothing other than 
a temporary expedient to quiet the Minds of the Indians and must fall of 
course in a few years especially when those Indians are consenting to our 
Occupying the Lands. Any person therefore who neglects the present 
oppertunity of hunting out good Lands and in some measure marking 
and distinguishing them for their own (in order to keep others from 
settling them) will never regain it . . . .63  
Once speculators had an interest in the land being available, they put pressure on 
the British government to relinquish its monopoly. But while they waited for the 
British, they were gobbling up land quite informally with crude contracts from 
dubious sources of authority; local courts were increasingly stamping approval on 
these transactions. Now, all that the speculators needed was a national sovereign 
to approve of the acts. 
The Proclamation of 1763 outlawed private purchase of Native American 
land, which had often created problems in the past due to fraud, intimidation, and 
conflicts over ownership. Instead, only the British government would be allowed 
to make future purchases of land. Furthermore, British colonists were forbidden 
to move beyond the line and settle on native lands, and colonial officials were 
forbidden to grant lands without royal approval. The proclamation gave the 
Crown a monopoly (versus the other European empires) on all future land 
purchases from American Indians. But for now, the British would let Indian 
nations remain on the land; with the exception of building a few forts and roads to 
serve the settlers, the British left those on the frontier to fend for themselves, 
refusing to commit troops or resources, and dismantling many of their forts.64 
 
63. Letter from George Washington to William Crawford (Sept. 21, 1767), in 2 THE 
WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON FROM THE ORIGINAL MANUSCRIPT SOURCES, 1745–1799, at 
467, 469 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed., Greenwood Press 1970) (1931). 
64. GRIFFIN, supra note 1, at 43–44. 
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This was a land “beyond law. There were no courts to evict, no laws to protect the 
interests of the wealthy, no speculative grants to safeguard. In short, the world 
beyond the line lay beyond regulation.”65 Squatters and speculators were 
widespread, but they were on their own to fend for their own safety.66 
Like the British, in the earliest years after the War of Independence, the 
U.S. central government was too weak to oversee the process of land negotiation, 
and squatters raced out throughout the new territories to claim lands. The 
government followed the British by continuing to intervene with a combination of 
treaties, land purchases, and restrictions on settlers, prohibiting the purchasing of 
land from indigenous people or even interaction with them. The government 
purchased 419 million acres from Native Americans between 1795 and 1838, 
paying more than eighty-one million dollars.67 
But the rage of land speculation at this time remained extensive; as 
Washington wrote, “[S]carce a valuable spot within any tolerable distance of it, is 
left without a claimant . . . . In defiance of the proclamation of Congress, they 
roam over the Country on the Indian side of the Ohio, mark out Lands, Survey, 
and even settle them.”68 As they had done with the British, speculators pushed the 
 
65. Id. at 60. 
66. ERIC HINDERAKER, ELUSIVE EMPIRES: CONSTRUCTING COLONIALISM IN THE OHIO 
VALLEY: 1673–1800 (1997). 
67. JOEL R. POINSETT, INDIANS REMOVED TO WEST MISSISSIPPI FROM 1789, H.R. DOC. 
NO 25–147, at 9 (1839). On the frequency of the United States paying for Indian lands, see BANNER, 
supra note 17. There is debate as to what “purchasing” meant regarding whether the terms the United 
States negotiated were fair. Certainly, there was a great deal of manipulation, coming from all levels of 
government and society. Thomas Jefferson’s letter to the governor of New York, William Henry 
Harrison, is indicative. Jefferson promoted the creation by the government of trading houses that 
would lead “good and influential individuals among them run in debt . . . .” Once in debt, Native 
Americans “become willing to lop them off by a cession of lands.” Letter from President Jefferson to 
William Henry Harrison (Feb. 27, 1803), in DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES INDIAN POLICY 22, 22 
(Francis Paul Prucha ed., 3d ed. 2000). Jefferson also gave a speech to Congress promoting legislation 
authorizing the creation of trading houses so as to counter Native Americans’ growing unease “at the 
constant diminution of the territory they occupy . . . .” Trading houses, he believed, would encourage 
Indians to abandon hunting, making forests less necessary, “and they will see advantage in exchanging 
them for the means of improving their farms and of increasing their domestic comforts.” President 
Jefferson on Indian Trading Houses (Jan. 18, 1803), in DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES INDIAN 
POLICY 21, 21 (Francis Paul Prucha ed., 3d ed. 2000). It seemed fairly commonplace that the United 
States underpaid for the land. In dicta, for instance, one Alabama Supreme Court judge wrote matter 
of factly,  
We can not, however, suppress the reflection, as the fact constitutes part of our authentic 
history, that the prices given by the Puritans, (Penn and others,) were scarcely more than 
nominal, compared with the then value of the lands: or with the prices which the United 
States have repeatedly offered to the various tribes in different states. The prices originally 
given, were doubtless, in most instances, less, and so considered, than would have been the 
expense of occupying the same lands, forcibly, against the consent of the Indians; nor is it 
to be forgotten, that the Indians were then numerous and formidable; and that policy may 
have been strongly united with humanity in dictating the terms by which the Indian titles 
were extinguished. 
Caldwell v. State, 1 Stew. & P. 327, 358 (Ala. 1832). 
68. Letter from George Washington to Jacob Read (Nov. 3, 1784), in 27 THE WRITINGS OF 
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United States to grant property rights to the Indians. Settlers competed with 
individual states in claiming land; indeed, states were often in competition with 
each other. Settlers were declaring their own states, and still others were seemingly 
looking to other empires for help.69 Washington wrote at the time that “[t]he 
Western settlers, (I speak now from my own observation) stand as it were upon a 
pivot; the touch of a feather, would turn them any way.”70 By the 1780s, it was 
increasingly seen as necessary that the national government intervene. Some of 
this came from the nation’s center, as the federal government tightly regulated the 
dispersal of land, but there was also an important place for the American state at 
the periphery. Because land disputes were often at the outer reaches of the nation, 
it would be the governing bodies—particularly land offices and courts—at the 
frontier that were at the forefront in determining who had the proper title. 
In the midst of all this confusion and the threat of both violence and 
international invasion, the U.S. government emerged in a number of ways to 
promote nation building while settling a variety of brewing internal conflicts. The 
first role largely played by the federal government (but not uniformly played, as 
individual states were also partaking in this activity) was to encourage population 
expansion to fill the open spaces. American leaders were constantly looking and 
aggressively advertising for settler populations from the East Coast of the United 
States and from northern Europe to fill spaces in the western frontier.71 
Populations were thought to increase the possibilities for securing the land against 
Indian or European attack and to cultivate and spur commerce in the regions. 
Specifically white populations were thought necessary to counteract what was 
thought to be a range of potential threats in areas with large nonwhite 
populations, from slave revolts in the South to terrorist violence in Indian 
territories to fears of miscegenation in areas where white settlers and nonwhite 
populations interacted. Specifically female populations were thought necessary to 
avoid the increasing pattern of American men having children with indigenous 
women.72 Support for European immigration in the early decades of the American 
nation was fairly bipartisan for these reasons, as were low land prices that were 
designed to encourage population settlement.73 The U.S. population increased 
sevenfold in the first seven decades counted by the Census Bureau. As of the 
Census in 1790, the population of the new nation was 3.9 million (seven hundred 
 
GEORGE WASHINGTON FROM THE ORIGINAL MANUSCRIPT SOURCES, 1745–1799, at 485, 486 
(John C. Fitzpatrick ed., Greenwood Press 1970) (1938). 
69. HINDERAKER, supra note 66, at 246. 
70. Letter from George Washington to Governor Benjamin Harrison (Oct. 10, 1784), in 27 
THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 68, at 471, 475. 
71. See HINDERAKER, supra note 66; ONUF, supra note 14, at 37. 
72. See Kerry Abrams, The Hidden Dimension of Nineteenth-Century Immigration Law, 62 VAND. L. 
REV. 1353, 1358 (2009). 
73. DANIEL J. TICHENOR, DIVIDING LINES: THE POLITICS OF IMMIGRATION CONTROL IN 
AMERICA 53–60 (2002). 
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thousand of whom were slaves); two-thirds of the population lived within fifty 
miles of the Atlantic Ocean. By 1850, the nation’s population had expanded to 
twenty-three million (including three million people classified as slaves). Settlers 
went westward moving through Ohio, Kentucky, Tennessee, and across the 
Mississippi River well into Texas, Missouri, and Iowa.74 
The government was also active in organizing the purchase and 
distribution of lands, retaining—at least officially—sole authority to purchase land 
from Indians and to supervise and facilitate land grabs by private actors. The 
Constitution of 1787 gave the federal government authority over Indian relations 
in the same manner as it treated diplomacy with other nations: all actions must be 
governed by constitutional treaty and war powers. President George Washington, 
with the Fort Haramar Treaty of 1789, established that Indian treaties required 
formal ratification in the same manner as European treaties.75 Land acquisition 
was centralized under the federal government within the first years of the 
Washington presidency, with boundary lines to be enforced by federal troops.76 
The government immediately provided both subsidies for entrepreneurs to 
speculate and a legal network to allow for the transfer of land to capitalist 
entrepreneurs. Politicians and lobbyists wanted land to build infrastructure, from 
canals to tunnels to land-grant universities to rail tracks. The federal government 
assisted this movement actively through numerous pieces of legislation such as the 
Land Ordinance Act of 1785 and the U.S. Land Office (which regulated property 
dispersal) and through the use of military personnel to protect capitalists and their 
property from outsiders.77 The Land Ordinance Act was designed to organize the 
surveying and marketing of public lands, to regulate land prices in a manner 
favorable to the federal government, and to protect against squatters.78 The 
Ordinance also determined where the land would be settled, clustered into small 
areas of lands with adjacent townships that would both develop local markets and 
protect against the potential of Indian attacks.79 The Northwest Ordinance of 
1787 further regulated the process, creating the logistics by which settlers could 
eventually apply to have their territory become a state and creating a timeline and 
set of procedural hurdles that would need to be followed before a population 
 
74. THE SEVENTH CENSUS OF THE UNITED STATES: 1850, at ix, xlvi (J.D.B. DeBow ed., 
Washington, Robert Armstrong Public Printer 1853), http://www.census.gov/prod/www/abs 
/decennial/1850.html. 
75. Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Territories, and the Nineteenth 
Century Origins of Plenary Power over Foreign Affairs, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1, 30 (2002). 
76. Horsman, supra note 2, at 45. 
77. BALOGH, supra note 14, at 180–84. 
78. ONUF, supra note 14, at 21–43. 
79. Id. at 30. 
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could ask for statehood.80 In later decades, banking laws provided easy credit and 
loans for purchasing land.81 
The Northwest Ordinance also mandated that the government would 
have to survey land before it would be distributed. This was designed to slow the 
process of settlers, giving the government greater ability to control the process of 
land population. Government agencies continually frowned upon squatters 
residing on unsurveyed land, rejecting adverse possession claims even when the 
squatters followed standard formulas in obtaining title. The government’s pattern 
of settlement paid attention to security issues—instead of scattering far and wide, 
the surveys moved in small, compact, rectangular patterns that pushed settlers to 
live close to each other so as to provide a common defense. Laws passed by 
Congress providing preemption rights to settlers occurred in accordance with the 
goal of maintaining control over peripheral lands as the preemption laws 
continually rewarded settlers rights to land when they were already surveyed, 
cultivated, and in close proximity to settled lands.82 Congress passed a bevy of 
preemption laws during these years to allow settlers to retain land they seized 
illegally. In 1816, Congress allowed up to 320 acres for anyone inhabiting and 
residing on public land otherwise not claimed. As of that year, more than two 
hundred thousand acres had been acquired, with the overwhelming portion in 
Ohio and Mississippi. In 1822, eighty thousand acres in Louisiana plus another 
eighteen thousand in Arkansas were claimed by private squatters. In 1826, another 
seven thousand acres were granted in Louisiana and thirty-five thousand in 
Florida. The government also gave out more than sixty million acres (as of 1880) 
in land bounties for military or naval service, another forty-five million acres for 
railroad land grants, and more than sixty-seven million acres for land-grant 
schools.83 
A. Residence and Defense 
Charles Maurice de Talleyrand once said, empire is “the art of putting 
men in their place.”84 A great deal of government activity in the early nineteenth 
century followed this maxim quite well: the United States (and the British before 
them) devoted extensive energy to populating and defending their newly 
conquered lands.85 By traditional standards, the United States was not a large or 
 
80. On the importance of the Northwest Ordinance, see Heumann, supra note 14, at 89–112. 
81. PAUL W. GATES, LANDLORDS AND TENANTS ON THE PRAIRIE FRONTIER: STUDIES IN 
AMERICAN LAND POLICY 55 (1973). 
82. See, e.g., ORLEANS LAND ACT, ch. 14, 2 Stat 617 (1811). 
83. DONALDSON, supra note 21, at 22–23. 
84. Quoted in ANTHONY PAGDEN, PEOPLES AND EMPIRES, at xxiii (Modern Library 2003) 
(2001). 
85. See TOMLINS, supra note 2, at 22 for a discussion of the importance of “population and 
the means to manage its movement, distribution, and behavior” for British colonization of the 
continent. 
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powerful government with the seeming capacity to carry out the conquering and 
planting of vast lands. It had little of a bureaucratic entity with the power to 
control large segments of society, and its budgets were fairly minimal.86 The 
military also was quite small, with the exceptions of temporary buildups for the 
War of 1812, the Seminole Wars, and the War with Mexico. Ira Katznelson has 
suggested that this was a reflection of “flexibility” more than a lack of strength: 
“The country’s lean, very mobile, ‘expansible’ military produced a remarkable, and 
relatively low-cost, extension to the country’s sovereign capacity and international 
reach.”87 But of equal importance was the government’s ability to intersect its 
authority with settlers and speculators to create a land policy that would defend 
itself against external threats.88 First, this involved making deals with large land 
speculators to secure land and clear populations. For example, shortly after the 
passage of the Land Ordinance of 1785, the federal government contracted with 
the Ohio Company to create settlements that would be populated with New 
Englanders. Congress paid the Company to find hardworking settlers who would 
in turn promote rapid economic growth.89 Typically, these settlements were not 
entirely “above board.” Government surveyors had notoriously close links with 
private land companies, and their determinations of land boundaries consistently 
favored the intersection between the federal government and private land 
companies.90 Quite frequently, the interests between the government and private 
land companies were intersected by more than just outside lobbying. One notable 
example was the dealings between government officials and the large trading firm 
of Panton, Leslie, which had asked for land from Indians in exchange for debts of 
nearly three hundred thousand dollars from the Cherokees, Chickasaws, 
Choctaws, and Creek. Panton, Leslie made agreements with federal agents 
whereby the firm would receive its money by taking Indian title of a large grant of 
land between the Oconee and Ocmulgee rivers. In turn, the United States would 
pay Panton, Leslie the amount of money owed by the Indians in exchange for the 
land.91 The United States would then attract immigrants to the land to help pay for 
the cost of purchasing it from the traders. In this case, however, while the United 
States was attracting new settlers to migrate, the government found that several 
Indian leaders opposed the cession of land and had not even been aware of the 
 
86. DONALDSON, supra note 21, at 20. More broadly, see SKOWRONEK, supra note 9. 
87. Katznelson, supra note 14, at 98. 
88. On the more general point of the government relying on private sources to defend 
national borders and interests, see Parrillo, supra note 14. 
89. ONUF, supra note 14, at 42–43. 
90. See, e.g., MONTOYA, supra note 41, at 11–12. 
91. With specific respect to the treaty signed with the Choctaws and Chickasaws, see The 
Choctaws (Jan. 15, 1808), in 4 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: INDIAN AFFAIRS 748–51 (Walter Lowrie & 
Matthew St. Clair Clarke eds., Washington, Gales & Seaton 1832). More broadly, see WILLIAM S. 
COKER & THOMAS D. WATSON, INDIAN TRADERS OF THE SOUTHEASTERN SPANISH 
BORDERLANDS: PANTON, LESLIE & COMPANY AND JOHN FORBES & COMPANY, 1783–1847, at 
243–49 (1986). 
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initial transaction. With settlers already on the land, the government then 
negotiated a treaty paying a small sum of money to resolve the matter.92 For 
roughly four hundred thousand dollars, the United States received eight million 
acres of land in parts of Georgia, Mississippi, and Tennessee. 
Second, the government saw the dispersal of land as a way of conquering 
and securing new territories. The government consistently wielded land in a 
manner that channeled new populations to areas of the country that were most 
“threatened” by indigenous populations. This would reach a high mark, after the 
time period being discussed here, with the Homestead Act of 1862. The 
government steered large populations to limited lands—the term Oklahoma 
“sooner,” for example, comes from the rush of people racing to claim limited land 
provided by the government. In the first half of the century, the government also 
consistently distributed land in a manner that helped create secure territory for a 
nation fighting Indian tribes on the cheap. 
A condition for obtaining the land from the government was that the 
settlers needed to be able to defend their property without requiring government 
intervention. The United States frequently sought military veterans and other 
armed settlers to conquer the land for the government, much as the Romans had 
utilized soldier-settlers to establish safe havens in areas that needed defense.93 This 
solved two capacity problems for the government—it was a way of paying 
bounties for military service (as opposed to paying dollars), and it saved the 
government in future war costs by enabling the armed settlers to defend 
themselves. The government consistently passed laws providing war veterans with 
land for their military service in fights against Indian nations. Military bounty land 
grants were numerous during this time, passed in 1847, 1850, 1852, and 1855. 
These grants led to more than one hundred million acres of land being given to 
ex-military personnel.94 To help do this effectively, government land policies 
emphasized providing available land in small increments, forcing settlers to live 
close to one another so as better to defend the land.95 
This is a history that predates the United States. In 1701, Virginia offered 
groups 200 acres of land if these groups would settle and be “able fighting men” 
who would protect the frontier and encourage further settlements.96 Numerous 
states provided military bounties during and after the Revolutionary War, and the 
 
92. COKER & WATSON, supra note 91, at 251–65. 
93. BURBANK & COOPER, supra note 3, at 29. 
94. DONALDSON, supra note 21, at 237. The bounty land grants were subject to widespread 
misuse; beneficiaries of the land were often swindled by land speculators or lost their land to squatters 
unknowingly residing on their possession. Many veterans also struggled to reach their land, since 
much of what was allocated was in remote dangerous areas on the outskirts of the nation. 
95. See Douglas W. Allen, Homesteading and Property Rights; or, “How the West Was Really Won,” 34 
J.L. & ECON. 1, 5 (1991). See also Terry L. Anderson & Fred S. McChesney, Raid or Trade? An Economic 
Model of Indian-White Relations, 37 J.L. & ECON. 39 (1994). 
96. PAUL W. GATES, HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAND LAW DEVELOPMENT 39 (1968). 
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state of Georgia provided one hundred acres for anyone who provided four 
months of service fighting Native Americans. With land far more abundant a 
resource than people or money, Georgia offered further bounties during the Creek 
War of 1787, promising 640 to 1000 acres of Creek land assuming the successful 
conclusion of the war.97 The Federal government passed the Federal Military Tract 
so that the nation could secure land north of the Ohio River.98 President 
Washington argued that land could not “be so advantageously settled by any other 
class of men as by the disbanded officers and soldiers of the army,” for this plan 
“would connect our government with the frontiers, extend our settlements 
progressively, and plant a brave, a hardy and respectable race of people as our 
advanced post, who would be always ready and willing (in case of hostility) to 
combat the savages and check their incursions.”99 Time and time again, the land 
made available was right on the frontier, in the midst of, or next to, Native 
Americans. Indeed, it often led to complaints from individual soldiers who found 
the land they received to be dangerous, difficult to use, or—periodically—
reclaimed by Native Americans after a new treaty or legal fight. Veterans were also 
used to fill in empty space. In 1819, the year after Illinois became a state, the 
region had less than one person per square mile. Military bounties were used to 
populate, providing servicemen with 160 acres each—though speculators often 
preyed on the remoteness of the tracts of land to buy at low prices and leave it 
empty while searching for buyers. 
Government motives were quite explicit in explaining the transfer of land 
to private citizens. In 1806, Thomas Jefferson recommended 160 acres be given to 
white males between the ages of eighteen to thirty-five who agreed to reside in 
Louisiana Territory for at least seven years: “I see no security for (New Orleans) 
but in planting on the spot the force which is to defend it.”100 A House report in 
that same year, with regards to the future of land claims in the Michigan territory, 
promoted 
a liberal policy to the people of the said territory, as a sure means of 
binding them to us by the ties of interest and of friendship; thereby to 
increase the physical force of the country, so as to oppose a formidable 
barrier to encroachments in that quarter, and soon supersede the 
necessity of the maintenance of a military force there by the United 
States.101 
 
97. See MILTON SYDNEY HEATH, CONSTRUCTIVE LIBERALISM: THE ROLE OF THE STATE 
IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN GEORGIA TO 1860, at 94–95 (1954). 
98. GATES, supra note 96, at 254. 
99. Washington is quoted in PAYSON JACKSON TREAT, THE NATIONAL LAND SYSTEM, 
1785–1820, at 21–22 (Russell & Russell 1967) (1910). 
100. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Mr. Gallatin (Jan. 31, 1807), in 5 THE WRITINGS OF 
THOMAS JEFFERSON 36 (H.A. Washington ed., New York, Taylor & Maury 1854). 
101. John G. Jackson, Land Titles in Michigan Territory (Mar. 18, 1806), in 1 AMERICAN STATE 
PAPERS: PUBLIC LANDS 244 (Walter Lowrie ed., Washington, Duff Green 1834). 
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In 1838, shortly after the removal of Native Americans in southern states across 
the Mississippi, Arkansas Senator William Fulton asked Congress to secure the 
land by creating a buffer to serve as a defense for the states of Missouri and 
Arkansas that are “exposed to great danger” against what he claimed were more 
than 330,000 “Indians with striking distance.” The “object,” he said, 
is to have a dense settlement of hardy adventurers all along the exposed 
frontier . . . . [S]hould hostilities ever break out between those Indians 
and our country, and an alliance be formed amongst them, they would be 
able to concentrate a force sufficient to endanger the lives and property 
of the inhabitants, and spread desolation and ruin throughout the frontier 
settlements. Thus are the citizens of Missouri and Arkansas placed in the 
very face of danger; and, as this state of things has been produced by the 
action of the Government itself, the obligation to afford to the people 
the most ample protection is more than doubled . . . . In offering those 
lands for sale, and inducing our citizens to settle them, a peaceable and 
quiet possession was most solemnly guarantied to all the purchasers . . . . 
Under these views, it is considered to be an object of the first importance 
to promote and obtain a dense settlement of able-bodied and enterprising 
men, convenient to the point of danger extending along the line of our 
southwestern frontier. To those who will thus expose themselves, and be 
willing to devote themselves to the service of their country, the 
inducement held out by the offer of a small tract of land appears to be 
the easiest mode which can be devised calculated to accomplish so 
desirable an object. No cheaper plan could be adopted for placing a 
strong and permanent force all along the frontier, than by offering the 
lands, which can only be occupied at the greatest hazard, to those who 
are prepared to peril every thing in their defence.102 
Four years later, in the same month (August) that the government ended 
the Second Seminole War—a war that at the time was the second most costly in 
American history—Congress passed the Armed Occupation Act, providing 160 
acres of land to those settlers who were armed and willing to occupy land south of 
Gainesville, Florida, land at the time still dangerous and controlled by Native 
Americans. Proposed by Senator Thomas Hart Benton of Missouri, Chair of the 
Committee on Military Affairs, it required settlers to reside on land that was more 
than two miles from a military fort for seven years, building a house, and being 
responsible for protecting the land from Indians. When fights broke out between 
settlers and Indians, communications between settlers and the army made clear 
that the government had no plans to help the settlers. The 1842 Act explicitly 
induced settlements on public domains in dangerous or distant portions of the 
 
102. STATEMENT OF SENATOR FULTON, S. DOC. NO. 25-152, at 1–3 (1838). 
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nation.103 Benton submitted a letter to the Senate from the Surgeon General’s 
Office at the end of 1838. The Surgeon General described that he had 
arrived at the conclusion that the war with the Seminole Indians can be 
terminated in a shorter time, and at less cost, by an armed occupation of 
the country, than by the continuance of a regular mode of warfare. Our 
armies have been for years engaged in hunting up, pursuing, and killing a 
few Indians in each campaign: and, judging from the success we have 
already had, it will take five or ten years longer to kill off those that still 
remain, and seem determined to remain, in the country. The 
establishment of military colonies, on the other hand, will change the 
system of warfare. Instead of the white men fighting the Indians in their 
natural fortresses, the Indians will have to come out and attack the whites 
within their lines of defence, and where the skill and intelligence of the 
civilized man can have its influence.104 
In proposing the bill, Benton stated on the House floor, “[t]he principle of the bill 
was residence and defence . . . . Residence on the land itself is not required, 
because the very nature of the case will require settlers to live together, in stations 
or block-houses, for mutual defence.”105 Senator Linn added in floor discussion 
that the settlers would go there under the inducement held out by the bill—a 
bounty in land—and fight for the soil, and save the blood of regular military 
forces that had been withdrawn from the region. The government (according to 
Linn) would have either to do one or the other: 
hold out an inducement for necessitous, enterprising, and bold men to go 
to Florida, and save the defenceless women and children from the knife 
of the savage; or speedily enlist another body of men, and give them this 
very bounty, and pay them from the treasury a heavy sum of money, to 
fight until the last Indian was driven from the Territory.  
Added Senator Preston:  
This bill was therefore to encourage poor and destitute, but vigorous, 
energetic, and hardy men, who were filled with enterprise, to go there and 
 
103. The bill in the Senate (S. 160) was proposed “to provide for the armed occupation and 
settlement of that part of Florida which is now overrun and infested by marauding bands of hostile 
Indians.” General Joseph M. Hernandez, commander of the East Florida Militia, referred to the land 
in 1839, as “now overrun by the Indians . . . .” S. DOC. NO. 25–93, at 1 (1839). For further 
discussion, see JENSEN, supra note 14, 177–86. 
104. SURGEON GENERAL’S OFFICE TO THOMAS H. BENTON, S. DOC. NO. 25–42, at 2–3 
(1838). Benton submitted another letter to the Senate, noting that “[n]o force employed against them, 
either in the former or present Seminole war, no matter by whom commanded, has ever been able to 
catch them . . . . Let them be crowded by settlers, and that which has invariably occurred throughout 
the whole history of our settlements will occur again, they will not only consent to remove, but will 
desire it as the greatest benefit the nation can confer upon them.” ADJUTANT GENERAL’S OFFICE TO 
THOMAS H. BENTON, S. DOC. NO. 25–163, at 4 (1839). 
105. CONG. GLOBE, 27TH CONG., 2D SESS., 619 (1842). 
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grapple with the Indian, and root him out for the sake of the bounty . . . . 
These men would go there with their knives, and a willingness to fight for 
their lands—and they would have the lands.106 
The Armed Occupation Act resulted in the patenting of 1317 claims 
acquiring a total of 210,720 acres of land.107 It was followed quickly by further 
legislation for other regions. The Oregon Donation Act in 1850 provided 320 
acres of land to men and 640 to married couples willing to venture into dangerous 
territories in Oregon. Residence and cultivation of land for four consecutive years 
was necessary to insure a patent from the government; this act resulted in more 
than 2.5 million acres of land going to 7317 patents.108 Another 290,000 acres 
went to nearly 1000 patents in the Washington Territory Donation Act of 1853, 
1.2 million acres in Texas were given to military volunteers in the early 1850s, and 
New Mexico settlers received another 160 acres for settling there before 1858, 
amounting to more than 50,000 acres settled. All of these donation acts were 
designed to give “land to settlers in these territories where they might help to 
reduce the Indian menace.”109 
III. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR REMOVAL 
In his visit to the United States, Alexis de Tocqueville was struck by how 
Americans borrow “legal phraseology and conceptions” in their controversies, 
ideas, and language.110 “Democratic government favors the political power of 
lawyers,” he wrote, because “lawyers constitute a power which is little dreaded and 
hardly noticed . . . . But it enwraps the whole of society, penetrating each 
component class and constantly working in secret upon its unconscious patient, 
till in the end it has molded it to its desire.”111 The power of law was most striking 
with regard to Native American removal. “[T]he dispossession of the Indians is 
accomplished in a regular and, so to say, quite legal manner.”112 He writes, “The 
Spaniards, by unparalleled atrocities which brand them with indelible shame, did 
not succeed in exterminating the Indian race . . . .” In contrast, Americans attained 
this result “with wonderful ease, quietly, legally, and philanthropically, without 
spilling blood and without violating a single one of the great principles of morality 
in the eyes of the world. It is impossible to destroy men with more respect to the 
laws of humanity.”113 
 
106. CONG. GLOBE, 27TH CONG., 2D SESS., 818 (1842). 
107. DONALDSON, supra note 21, at 295. 
108. Id. at 296–97. 
109. GATES, supra note 96, at 390. Specifically with regards to Texas, see THOMAS LLOYD 
MILLER, BOUNTY AND DONATION LAND GRANTS OF TEXAS, 1835–1888 (1967). 
110. TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 8, at 270. 
111. Id. at 266, 270. 
112. Id. at 324. 
113. Id. at 339. Tocqueville’s argument continues to inspire current work, as reflected in 
Daniel Hulsebosch’s recent claim that Americans “conquered the continent less with violence than 
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Tocqueville overstates the civility with which indigenous populations 
were removed from their land. Settler violence and military wars were common 
throughout the period, and they involved frequent brutality and human rights 
atrocities directed at people of all ages.114 But what Tocqueville recognized was 
the way in which legal mechanics disempowered indigenous populations on a day-
to-day basis, moving slowly but surely to engulf their lands within the province of 
American authority. By the time “Indian removal” became the official policy of 
the national government, much of the work of American expansion had already 
been accomplished. 
Ironically, the Supreme Court’s role in this period is most often 
remembered for its general institutional weakness. After all, it was at the height of 
the federal government’s Indian removal policy that the Court in Worchester v. 
Georgia tried to stop the policy and ignominiously failed; Andrew Jackson was 
reported to say that if Justice Marshall wanted the law enforced, the Chief Justice 
would have to enforce it himself. Further decisions on land policy such as Green v. 
Biddle were also ineffective because the Court’s promotion of a contractual 
understanding of property law was contested and (in this specific case) rejected by 
local and state governments promoting alternative understandings of property that 
rested on settler rights. The Supreme Court did play a role in legitimating the 
taking of land from indigenous peoples, most notably in the high profile cases 
Fletcher v. Peck and Johnson v. M’Intosh that denied indigenous title to land based on 
legal doctrines deriving from sources as varied as natural law and declarations by 
the Pope. 
But when de Tocqueville was referring to the importance of law, he was 
thinking not of the Supreme Court but the broader legal system and its range of 
courts, litigators, and laws that would have the true significance in promoting 
American empire during these years. From symbolic rituals of legality as a means 
of asserting legitimacy to formalized legal process and norms, the law was an 
important arena not merely in justifying the land taking but in being the principle 
means through which the taking was channeled.115 In this section, I provide a brief 
overview of two important ways that the U.S. legal system promoted expansionist 
policies: its particular understanding of property law and the activity of local and 
state courts in enforcing property law independent of the Supreme Court. I end 
with an examination of the particular role of the Supreme Court in not defending 
Native American property rights (when its own jurisprudence provided reason to 
think that it should have). 
 
with the confidence with which they carried forward their notions of constitutional liberty, notions 
forged in the matrix of empire.” HULSEBOSCH, supra note 2, at 11. 
114. See, e.g., BLACKHAWK, supra note 7; GRIFFIN, supra note 1. 
115. See generally BENTON, supra note 19; FORD, supra note 46; TOMLINS, supra note 2. 
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A. Property Law 
The government, private land companies, and settlers all consistently 
relied on common law to defend their rights to the land. Courts were critical to 
this process because officials in the public land departments were overwhelmed by 
the task of sorting through the myriad of land claims leaving courts the primary 
arena for the defense of land rights. The government also had on its hands the 
difficulty of sorting out a myriad of conflicting claims over land. As one 
congressional report on the territory of Michigan found in 1806, “notwithstanding 
the settlement of this country for nearly one hundred and fifty years, only eight 
regular titles are to be found within its limits.”116 This congressional report found 
claims dating back to the first years of the 1700s founded on French, British, 
Canadian, and Indian grants, as well as claims of squatters founding their rights 
based on settlements and improvements involving land masses as great as one 
hundred thousand acres.117 Throughout the history of the period, debates about 
land became litigated debates in the courtroom; land weighed constantly on the 
minds of speculators and settlers alike, and the process of litigation, in particular 
its costs, often overwhelmed indigenous populations into compliance, even when 
the law was on their side.118 Recognition of what types of legal actions were 
needed to win in court shaped settler actions and left indigenous populations 
constantly making mistaken choices. 
But success in the courtroom was not just a product of Americans being 
more aware of the rules of the game. The common law applications of land rights 
were themselves rooted in notions about conquest and racial hierarchies that dated 
to Roman law and fifteenth- and sixteenth-century European imperial law. It 
rested both on understandings of human progress that privileged European 
settlers and rigid racial hierarchies. Many of the assumptions of the common-law 
origins only worked if indigenous populations were not perceived as equals. The 
idea of terra nullius is emblematic of this: it is a principle stating that unoccupied 
land was common property until put to use; the first to use the land appropriately 
became its owner. Only by ignoring indigenous people as users of the land could 
such an application be warranted. Common law also dated to Spanish use of the 
“discovery doctrine” that legitimated the taking of indigenous land on the 
assumption that Christians had a right to conquest.119 Perhaps most directly 
important for American common law was the British justice and legal scholar Sir 
Edward Coke, who in a famous decision in Calvin’s Case first addressed the rights 
 
116. Jackson, supra note 101, at 263. 
117. Id. at 268–69. 
118. See, e.g., ALMAGUER, supra note 44, at 80–81; SIDNEY L. HARRING, CROW DOG’S CASE: 
AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY, TRIBAL LAW, AND UNITED STATES LAW IN THE NINETEENTH 
CENTURY (1994); Deborah A. Rosen, Colonization Through Law: The Judicial Defense of State Indian 
Legislation, 1790–1880, 46 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 26 (2004). 
119. WILLIAMS, supra note 50. 
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of aliens under British common law and helped provide an early legal legitimacy 
for imperial conquest. In the case involving a Scotsman’s rights under British law, 
Coke delineated a theory of rights for the British Empire that held its common 
law protections did not extend beyond English soil. Coke made a critical 
distinction between the legal rights of aliens who were friends of Britain, those 
who were enemies, and—among those enemies—those who were temporary or 
perpetual enemies. He argued that perpetual enemies 
cannot maintain any action, or get any thing within this realm . . . . All 
infidels are in law perpetui inimici, perpetual enemies (for the law presumes 
not that they will be converted, that being remota potentia, a remote 
possibility) for between them, as with devils, whose subjects they be, and 
Christian, there is a perpetual hostility, and can be no peace . . . .120 
Since infidels are outside of the law and its potential protections, the conquering 
king has absolute authority over conquered subjects. 
Scholars have been careful to point out both the degree to which Coke’s 
arguments rested on faulty case law, as well as the limited use of Calvin’s Case as an 
outright sanctioning of imperial conquest—the case has never officially been 
followed, has been disagreed with, and has been widely manipulated and 
maneuvered by numerous judges and legal experts.121 At the same time, Coke’s 
influence as both a judge and interpreter of British law had huge influence both 
for British and (as we will see) later American conceptions of imperial authority.122 
As Lauren Benton has argued, the case’s discussion of differential citizenship and 
subjectivity as well as divided sovereignty “provided part of the framework for 
describing legally uneven imperial territories.”123 Contributing further to this 
discussion was British and European legal thought about the ownership of 
unpossessed and uncultivated land. In addition to the discussion earlier in this 
paper about John Locke’s views of property, other British philosophers and legal 
theorists, from Adam Smith and Thomas More to John Stuart Mill and William 
Blackstone, developed a series of arguments premised in ideas of progress and 
civilization that legitimated the taking of uncultivated land that was deemed as not 
being properly used. A scholar who was amply cited by American jurists and was 
quoted frequently by George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, and others, was 
Emmerich Vattel, a Swiss writer, who wrote in 1758 in The Law of Nations that 
cultivation and ownership of land was a critical part of progress. Although he 
rejected the discovery doctrine and trusted democratic sovereignty even in times 
 
120. Sir Edward Coke, Calvin’s Case, 77 ENG. REP. 377, 397 (1608) (citation omitted). 
121. See, e.g., FORD, supra note 46, at 14–15; HULSEBOSCH, supra note 2, at 20–32; RANA, 
supra note 2, at 20–98; WILLIAMS, supra note 50, at 199–205. 
122. Notably, see HULSEBOSCH, supra note 2, at 20–32; J.G.A. POCOCK, THE ANCIENT 
CONSTITUTION AND THE FEUDAL LAW: A STUDY OF ENGLISH HISTORICAL THOUGHT IN THE 
SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 30–55 (reissue with a retrospect 1987). 
123. BENTON, supra note 19, at 29. 
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of war and conquest, his claims that those who were ill-prepared to partake in this 
process could be removed or even enslaved was widely received by American legal 
thinkers. As he wrote of indigenous populations, “disdain to cultivate the earth” 
entitles Europeans to occupy their land and even to exterminate them “as savage 
and pernicious beasts.” In viewing cultivation as critical to land possession, 
American settlers were able to view both the land of the North American 
continent as empty and their own role in cultivation as a legitimate reason for 
taking possession.124 
A popular definition of property rights in many parts of the United States 
was that title required that an individual take singular possession of the land. 
Courts consistently (though often inaccurately) ruled that because Indians were in 
constant motion, they could not claim attachment to a specific area of land to 
legitimate a right to property. The power of eminent domain was defended as a 
legitimate reason for why the American government should be entitled to take the 
land with “just compensation.” Squatters, under rights of preemption, were 
entitled to land they occupied as long as they were not removed from the land by 
the previous owner. Unaware of such legal formalities, indigenous populations 
often let settlers live peaceably on their land, only to later find those settlers had 
attained title.125 Similar problems occurred when Indians “sold” land with an 
expectation that they were really “renting” the land, which was indicated by the 
fact that Indian nations would ask for continual payments over time for settlers to 
occupy the same piece of land.126 Courts consistently found against Indian 
ownership when settlers were able to show continuous possession. The New York 
Supreme Court held that “[i]t is a fact too notorious to require proof that Indian 
lands . . . were invariably held in common, and that individual property in land was 
not known amongst them.”127 The Louisiana Supreme Court denied the Caddo 
Indians ownership because there was “no evidence that the Indians ever hunted 
over [the lands], although they appear sometimes to have turned their horses on 
 
124. See M.D. VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS 94 (Northampton, S. & E. Butler 1805) 
(1758); see also BANNER, supra note 17, at 150–90. Rana’s argument focuses on the historical longevity 
of this view dating back to Locke and British legal thought. See RANA, supra note 2, at 33–37. For a 
specific example of this view in practice in early eighteenth-century Massachusetts, see JEAN M. 
O’BRIEN, DISPOSSESSION BY DEGREES: INDIAN LAND AND IDENTITY IN NATICK, 
MASSACHUSETTS, 1650–1790 (1997). Banner argues, however, that it was a newer phenomenon, 
dating to the beginning of the nineteenth century when Americans began to focus more directly on 
cultivation and farming as a necessity for property ownership. Prior to that time, Locke aside, 
Americans recognized that Indians were farmers and legitimate owners of their land. 
125. Accusations of lawyers manipulating, swindling, and otherwise ascertaining power of 
attorney over indigenous people, leading to land sales, was commonplace. Questions of who within 
indigenous populations had the authority to sell land also marred an otherwise messy and corrupt 
process by which Native Americans sold land to speculators. 
126. Thomas J. Sugrue, The Peopling and Depeopling of Early Pennsylvania: Indians and Colonists, 
1680–1720, 116 PA. MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 3 (1992). 
127. Jackson v. Sharp, 14 Johns. 472, 476 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1817). 
Assembled_Issue_3 v5 (Do Not Delete) 2/22/2012  9:07 AM 
946 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol.  1:3 
 
them . . . .”128 The Alabama Supreme Court referenced Vattel to help defend the 
assertion that “a mere travelling over a country, and occasionally erecting a 
monument, without occupying and cultivating the soil, is not sufficient, to give a 
title to the domain, nor to empire; and that the pretensions of those who live by 
the chase, must yield to the cultivator of the soil.”129 The Tennessee Supreme 
Court found property rights in land to derive from the “usefulness” of creating “a 
barrier to the Indians in difficult times.”130 In a later case from the same state, 
written by future U.S. Supreme Court Justice John Catron, the court cited Calvin’s 
Case, international law dating to Roman times, and numerous European 
philosophers to support the idea that “[o]ur rights on this continent had their 
origin in discovery, in the fifteenth century,” and as such, entitled Tennessee to 
have ownership over Cherokee lands on grounds that the lands had been 
conquered.131 
Property law functioned in a second way that enabled more aggressive 
land taking from the Indians. Property law emphasized that there is no one “true” 
owner of land, only a multitude of potential claimants with title ultimately 
determined by the entity with the “best” claim; this emphasis helped inspire 
competition for acquiring land even in times when it was politically prohibited. 
Settlers and land speculators, as discussed earlier, often bought land owned by 
Indians during periods when the government either did not own the land itself, or 
owned the land but prohibited private transactions with indigenous people. These 
private buyers made these purchases as “speculative” buys, assuming all the while 
that their interests would be upheld in a court of law. Although this activity pre-
dated American independence, the Supreme Court further supported the 
speculative purchases when, in Fletcher v. Peck, it upheld a land deal of this type. 
Speculators took the Court’s decision as a sign that they could go ahead with land 
accumulation even when the United States had not yet acquired the land through 
treaty, because they assumed that the United States would eventually own the land 
(and later sell to these speculators). “When speculators traded in Indian land, what 
they were buying and selling was not land, or even the right to buy land from the 
Indians, but rather the prospect of being the owner of the land once the government 
bought the land from the Indians.”132 States during this time sold parcels of land 
that they did not own, in part because they believed that they did own it, and in 
part because they believed that they (or the federal government) would soon own 
it.133 Lawyers versed in property law seized on these opportunities of preemption; 
as long as Indian land was a title in fee simple, they could draw up contracts that 
 
128. Brooks v. Norris, 6 Rob. 175, 183 (La. 1843). 
129. Caldwell v. State, 1 Stew. & P. 327, 339 (Ala. 1832). 
130. Gould v. Hoyle, 4 Tenn. 100, 102 (Tenn. 1816). 
131. State v. Foreman, 16 Tenn. 256, 258–59 (Tenn. 1835). 
132. BANNER, supra note 17, at 160. 
133. Id. at 190. 
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provided a transfer of the land in the event of a future transaction. State courts, 
meanwhile, repeatedly approved the contracts; the Supreme Court of Virginia 
declared, “Indian title did not impede . . . the power of the legislature to grant the 
land”—and other state courts soon followed this decision.134 The result, then, was 
that settlers and speculators were dividing up land that was not theirs and relying 
on the dynamics of property law to gain a subsequent legal claim. 
B. Federalism 
A great deal of the activism around land taking was in local courts, 
particularly those at the borders of the nation. Squatters associations often set up 
their own courts, particularly in new territories such as Kansas, where they 
followed their own interpretation of property law and takings; though these 
associations’ legal matters rarely withstood challenge from federal court, their 
commanding presence over the land (as forged by squatter justice) inevitably 
forced legislative officials to negotiate compromises of preemption to satisfy the 
new status quo.135 Land commissioners were created by the federal government 
on a number of occasions—such as in the aftermath of the Mexican-American 
War—for the purpose of adjudicating disputes between indigenous and settler 
rights in new territories. As mentioned earlier, these commissions tended to bias 
their findings toward American settlers. But more broadly, state courts in a wide 
range of areas around the country defended state rights and asserted principles of 
federalism to justify asserting legal authority over Native American nations.136 One 
common method was to assert state jurisdiction by claiming that if indigenous 
populations were surrounded by the state, the interstate commerce clause and 
federal Constitution failed to apply.137 State courts also were active in determining 
whether contracts between Native Americans and whites for the sale of land were 
enforceable and whether Native Americans could participate in litigation.138 
Finally, states regulated criminal jurisdiction, whether on matters of violence, theft, 
or trespass. New York and numerous New England state laws claimed jurisdiction 
over Indian lands in criminal cases—they argued that when Indians interacted 
with the state, they subjected themselves to state law.139 In the 1820s, southern 
 
134. Id. at 162. 
135. For examples in Kansas, see Records of the Squatter Association of Whitehead District, Doniphan 
County, 13 KANSAS HISTORICAL QUARTERLY 16 (Martha Caldwell ed., 1944); Anna Heloise Abel, 
Indian Reservations in Kansas and the Extinguishment of Their Title, 8 TRANSACTIONS OF THE KANSAS 
STATE HISTORICAL SOCIETY, 1903–1904, at 72 (Geo. W. Martin ed., 1904). 
136. TIM ALAN GARRISON, THE LEGAL IDEOLOGY OF REMOVAL (2002); HARRING, supra 
note 118; Rosen, supra note 118. 
137. Rosen, supra note 118, at 32–33. See also United States v. Cisna, 25 F. Cas. 422 (C.C.D. 
Ohio 1835) (No. 14,795) (holding federal laws were inoperative in Ohio because the reservation was 
so small and surrounded by state populations). 
138. Rosen, supra note 118, at 28. 
139. See, e.g., Goodell v. Jackson, 20 Johns. 693 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1823). 
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states such as Alabama, Georgia, and Mississippi used state criminal law to expand 
state jurisdiction through Indian land, claiming that states and not the federal 
government have the authority through the Commerce Clause to regulate affairs 
internal to state sovereignty.140 
Even when the Supreme Court decided a matter of specific relevance to 
Indian property rights, state courts felt invigorated to move in different directions. 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Fletcher v. Peck was ambiguous enough in its 
understanding of Indian title that it “provided temporary political quiescence 
rather than legal certitude and did nothing to slow down the encroachments of 
whites onto Indian lands.”141 Georgians took the case to mean that they 
controlled the fate of Indian lands in their territory. Georgian state courts referred 
to Fletcher as precedent for their authority over Indian nations. As the state court 
declared in Georgia v. Tassels, “every acre of land in the occupancy of his sovereign, 
independent Cherokee Nation, is vested in fee in the State of Georgia.”142 The 
Georgian government was particularly emphatic in asserting its rights to extinguish 
Indian land claims and fight wars with Indians within its declared territory. In the 
mid-1790s, the Georgian government, led by Governor Jared Irwin, continued to 
form and maintain state militias to fight the Creek, claiming that they had a 
constitutional right to protect themselves against imminent danger, despite being 
told repeatedly by the federal government that it was both unconstitutional and 
unwarranted given the broader foreign policy agendas of the time.143 After 
protracted battles with the federal government over land claims, Georgia agreed to 
give up land rights that extended to the Mississippi River in exchange both for the 
rights of legitimate settlers to keep their land possessions and for the federal 
government “at their own expense, [to] extinguish, for the use of Georgia, as early 
as the same can be peaceably obtained, on reasonable terms, the Indian title” that 
remained within state boundaries.144 
 
140. HARRING, supra note 118, at 36–44. See also FORD, supra note 46. 
141. GARRISON, supra note 136, at 84. 
142. State v. Tassels, Dudley (Ga) 229, 234 (Ga. 1830). For further discussion of this case, see 
GARRISON, supra note 136, at 112–16. And of course, this case represented one of the more infamous 
moments when a state defied the Supreme Court. While the Supreme Court was weighing its own 
decision, the state of Georgia executed Tassel, leaving the case moot. 
143. See Report of February 4, 1813, in REPORTS FROM THE WAR DEPARTMENT 26, 27 
(Washington, E. De Krafft 1818). 
144. Georgia Cession (Apr. 26, 1802), in 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: PUBLIC LANDS, supra 
note 101, at 113, 114. At the same time, the U.S. government forged a treaty with the Creek Indians 
to buy some of their land. General Wilkinson addressed the Creek Nation on May 29, 1802:  
We see that hunting, to which you and your ancestors have heretofore resorted for 
support, is failing you year after year. We know that this precarious resource will soon be 
entirely destroyed, and that you can no longer rely on it for the maintenance of your old 
men, your wives, and your children; and we believe that, thus circumstanced, you should 
look around you and endeavor to provide, from the means you possess, some more 
permanent and more certain dependence, to protect you against the poverty and 
wretchedness which may otherwise be your portion. We address you in plain language, but 
with sincere hearts, when we say, that, of the much you possess, we think a little may 
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C. The Supreme Court 
Perhaps ironically, the one body that ought to have respected Native 
American property rights was, quite arguably, the Supreme Court. The Marshall 
Court, after all, was renowned for emphasizing the importance of contract law and 
nationalizing economic procedures and sovereignty;145 this contrasted with the law 
being demanded by settlers, one that often intertwined with states rights activists 
and republican-spirited yeoman supporters of productive cultivation. In many of 
the decisions by state courts, the justices were protecting rights of settlers who 
gained property title by adding value to the land. They were also promoting the 
rights of individual states to make their own determinations about land ownership 
and sovereignty, and not abide simply by the authority of the national 
government. These were not typically ideas that had been supported by Justice 
Marshall or the majorities on the Marshall Court. 
In Fletcher v. Peck, Marshall’s nationalist and contractual interpretation on 
economic matters intersected with land speculators attempting to preemptively 
buy land that was owned by Native Americans. The Court here, for the first time, 
addressed the fact that some of the land had been occupied by Indian nations at 
the time of the sale. Georgia had proclaimed the lands “vacant” and assumed 
dominion.146 In this case, the Court largely skirted the issue but for a final 
paragraph of the decision that seemed to be an afterthought—“the nature of the 
Indian title . . . is not such as to be absolutely repugnant to seisin in fee on the part 
of the state.” The Court allowed the selling of the lands by the Georgia legislature 
(despite Native Americans owning the land), holding that the ownership was not 
“absolutely repugnant to” ownership of the title. Native Americans, then, held title 
to the land and a right to occupy it “until it be legitimately extinguished.”147 But 
the facts and context of the case had some bearing on future decisions involving 
Indian title. The case involved the New England Mississippi Land Company’s 
successful appeal of its claim to a contract provided them by the Georgia state 
 
suffice, to attain for you this great and desirable end. We ask you, whether you do not 
think it might be advisable for you to sell some of your lands, the most distant from your 
towns and villages, to provide for the old, the poor, and the helpless, among your people, 
and to establish a broad foundation of peace and comfort, for those who may rise up after 
you are laid in your graves. This has ever been the policy of your white brethren, in every 
age and every country, and will it not be for your interests to follow their example? We 
know a market can be found for some of your lands, at a price which may relieve the 
present wants of your whole nation, and with care and attention on your part, provide for 
the wants of your posterity. You can receive a payment in hand, and payments year after 
year, in money or goods, at your option; not such as you have heretofore received for the 
lands you have sold, but such as honest men may offer, and freemen may accept.  
The Creeks (Dec. 28, 1802), in 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: INDIAN AFFAIRS, supra note 91, at 668, 
673. 
145. For a classic standard of this argument, see, for example, ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE 
AMERICAN SUPREME COURT ch. 3 (5th ed. 2010) (1960). 
146. LINDSAY G. ROBERTSON, CONQUEST BY LAW: HOW THE DISCOVERY OF AMERICA 
DISPOSSESSED INDIGENOUS PEOPLES OF THEIR LANDS 67 (2005). 
147. Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. 87, 142–43 (1810). 
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legislature—a contract that had been fueled with bribery money.148 Here, the 
Court declared that the contract could not be invalidated by a decision of a state 
legislature, even as, in this case, the state legislature rested its invalidation on the 
premise that the contract was the result of bribery and scandal. “No party shall . . . 
pass any . . . law impairing the obligations of contracts.” The Court held that the 
sale of land by the Georgia legislature, whether a product of bribery or not, had to 
stand as a private transaction, and the speculators who purchased the land were to 
receive compensation. 
Fletcher foreshadowed many of the great contract decisions of the 
Marshall years, from M’Culloch v. State to Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward to 
Gibbons v. Ogden. One of those cases, Green v. Biddle, could well have been the way 
in which Marshall handled indigenous rights to land. This case pitted settlers in 
Kentucky who improved and possessed land against its original owners who 
claimed original title in absentia. Here, Kentucky passed laws preventing the 
contractual owners from claiming land against the settlers who had cultivated and 
lived on the land. There was no claim by the absentia owners of possession or 
cultivation, merely a contractual right. The Marshall Court, in an opinion written 
by Justice Story, dismissed the importance of land cultivation and current 
possession; original title was an original contract, and this was most sacred under 
law.149 
But in the same year as Biddle was decided, the Supreme Court also 
decided Johnson v. McIntosh, a case that involved a title dispute between private land 
speculators from the Illinois-Wabash Company and a state entity, this time the 
U.S. government, over lands that had formerly (presently) been owned by Native 
American nations in Illinois.150 The legal question at hand was whether Indian 
tribes were sovereign; if they were, the tribes could legally sell their land to the 
land company who then could claim title; if not, the land was owned by the 
United States. For much of the decision, Justice Marshall drew on the lengthy 
history of European conquest and its legal underpinnings. Country after country 
in Europe divided up the American continent and distributed land possessions on 
the basis of the principle of discovery that gave them title to the land they 
conquered.151 Indians initially occupied all of this land, Marshall admitted. But “all 
the nations of Europe who have acquired territory on this continent have asserted 
in themselves, and have recognised in others, the exclusive right of the discoverer 
to appropriate the lands occupied by the Indians.”152 Ultimately, “[c]onquest gives 
a title which the Courts of the conqueror cannot deny . . . .”153 
 
148. Id. at 142. 
149. Green v. Biddle, 21 U.S. 1 (1823). 
150. Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543 (1823). 
151. Id. at 573–76. 
152. Id. at 584. 
153. Id. at 588. 
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For Marshall, legitimacy rested on a variety of themes, none of which 
were fully explicated in the case itself, about the rights of the conquered, whether 
rooted in the discovery doctrine, Coke’s division between infidels and Christians, 
or Locke’s understanding of property rights. Indians, he argued at one point, were 
“fierce savages, whose occupation was war, and whose subsistence was drawn 
chiefly from the forest. To leave them in possession of their country, was to leave 
the country a wilderness . . . .”154 The state of Virginia, he argued later, was 
granted rights to “vacant lands” and no distinction was made between such lands 
and those “occupied by Indians.”155 
These last passages about “vacant lands” are inconsistent with Marshall’s 
standard views about original title. Marshall also rejected arguments made before 
the Court that Indians inherently had first possession and thus full sovereignty 
over the land. This was the argument of the land speculators who hoped, if the 
Court granted original title to the Indians, that they would be the recipients of the 
title through purchase. McIntosh countered that the Indians had not used the land 
for agricultural purposes, and thus the land was open to “a people of 
cultivators.”156 In siding with McIntosh, Marshall is remembered primarily for 
putting his stamp on American imperial law; the United States reigns supreme in 
its right to conquest, and all those who are defeated have secondary rights under 
the nation. But, it is also worth noting that Marshall reversed himself on the 
sacredness of contract law; here, unlike in Fletcher and Biddle, Native Americans 
were distinguished as not having the right of original title. This would not be the 
last time that he went against general Marshall Court principles when it came to 
matters of indigenous rights. 
Indeed, legal scholars have since written much of what happened next 
with national expansion, the Supreme Court, and the rights of Native 
Americans.157 Soon after McIntosh, and immediately after the 1828 presidential 
election victory of Andrew Jackson, the state of Georgia passed a law to remove 
Cherokee Indians from their lands within charter limits. The Georgia state 
legislature abolished the Cherokee’s court and legislature, annexed their land, and 
divided it up for auction in a state lottery; Alabama and Mississippi passed laws 
that permitted whites to settle on Indian lands which led to “swarms of whites” 
occupying the disputed territories.158 Congress passed the Indian Removal Act of 
1830, following a close vote in the House during which supporters consistently 
 
154. Id. at 590. 
155. Id. at 596. 
156. McIntosh is quoted in GARRISON, supra note 136, at 91. 
157. See generally GARRISON, supra note 136; JILL NORGREN, THE CHEROKEE CASES: TWO 
LANDMARK FEDERAL DECISIONS IN THE FIGHT FOR SOVEREIGNTY (2004); SMITH, supra note 20, 
at 237–42; Philip P. Frickey, Marshalling Past and Present: Colonialism, Constitutionalism, and Interpretation in 
Federal Indian Law, 107 HARV. L. REV. 381 (1993); Gerard N. Magliocca, The Cherokee Removal and the 
Fourteenth Amendment, 53 DUKE L.J. 875 (2003). 
158. ROGIN, supra note 7, at 212–13, 219. 
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referred to the McIntosh decision to legitimize and justify the law.159 The Act gave 
President Andrew Jackson the authority to negotiate removal treaties with the 
tribes, and Jackson moved quickly to order federal officials to negotiate such 
treaties. 
The Supreme Court further legitimated Georgia and Jackson in Cherokee 
Nation v. Georgia. In this case, the Cherokees sued as a foreign state, claiming that 
as such, they could only be dealt with through a federal treaty. The Court here 
declared that Native American tribes did not have jurisdiction because they were 
not a foreign state, but instead, “may, more correctly, perhaps, be denominated 
domestic dependent nations. They occupy a territory to which we assert a title 
independent of their will . . . . [T]hey are in a state of pupilage. Their relation to 
the United States resembles that of a ward to his guardian.” Moreover, Marshall 
argued that the Court did not have the jurisdiction—“the bill requires us to 
control the legislature of Georgia . . . . The propriety of such an interposition by 
the court may well be questioned. . . . If it be true that the Cherokee nation have 
rights, this is not the tribunal in which those rights are to be asserted.”160 As in 
McIntosh, Marshall seemed to be finding new grounds to deny the Cherokees 
rights—grounds that he typically was unconcerned with in other charges leveled 
against state obstructionists. 
With this decision in Cherokee Nation, however, Justice Marshall then 
subsequently reversed the position of the Court. In an about-face, the discovery 
doctrine was repudiated by the Court in Worcester v. Georgia. Here, Marshall wrote 
that Georgia’s attempt to rule over the Cherokee nation violated federal law.161 In 
Worcester, a case involving four missionaries contesting their arrest by the Georgian 
government on Cherokee land, the Court suggested that Native American tribes 
were sovereign nations akin to small countries in Europe: “The Indian nations had 
always been considered as distinct, independent political communities, retaining 
their original natural rights, as the undisputed possessors of the soil, from time 
immemorial, with the single exception of that imposed by irresistible power . . . .”162 
As a result, Marshall held that “all intercourse with them shall be carried on 
exclusively by the government of the union.”163 This was a bold decision: state 
law, Marshall declared, is preempted by federal law and by treaties between the 
national government and the Cherokees. 
As stated earlier, President Jackson actively ignored the decision, and 
with additional appointments to the Court, had the decision overturned—once 
again reestablishing the right of discovery for a conquering nation.164 But in a 
 
159. 21 REG. DEB. 994, 1005–16 (1830). 
160. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 17, 20 (1831). 
161. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832). 
162. Id. at 559. 
163. Id. at 557. 
164. See Martin v. Lessee of Waddell, 41 U.S. 367 (1842); Mitchel v. United States, 40 U.S. 52 
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larger context, Worchester is hardly an indictment of Court authority. The Supreme 
Court was not being defied so much as it was, far too late, trying to suddenly 
reverse a long line of decisions coming from a multitude of courts and regions 
that established American title over indigenous lands. 
IV. CONCLUSION: INDIAN REMOVAL AND THE END OF THE FIRST PHASE OF 
AMERICAN EMPIRE 
The Cherokee decisions and the Indian Removal Act, then, were the final 
pieces of a long political process that came well after the primary activity of 
indigenous removal had been accomplished. By the 1820s, most of the indigenous 
population east of the Mississippi had disappeared. In a report to Congress in 
1825, the Office of Indian Affairs placed the number of Native Americans 
remaining east of the Mississippi at roughly 130,000, a small fraction of those that 
resided on these lands just twenty-five years prior. Subsequent Indian removal was 
not just a final piece—some reports claim as many as a third of those forced to 
emigrate lost their lives in the process, and instances during the 1830s in which 
Native Americans were bullied, bludgeoned, and beaten into leaving their homes 
would qualify as genocide under current international legal standards.165 But this 
was not a moment that was followed by earnest self-reflection by the United 
States. 
With the removal of Indians east of the Mississippi River, expansion 
continued in earnest to the west and south, Texas and New Mexico to California, 
and across the prairies of the Dakotas, Oklahoma, and on to Oregon and 
Washington. As the United States became stronger, and as indigenous populations 
became weaker, American politicians bargained and negotiated less and started 
taking more, often with widespread violence.166 In 1886, a special operations force 
of the United States army found and captured Geronimo, the notorious leader of 
the powerful Apache Empire. Geronimo, while hiding in the mountains of 
Arizona, had terrorized and resisted settlers and militaries from both the United 
States and Mexico for decades. Four years later, the Massacre of Wounded Knee 
in 1890 led to the death of 150 Lakota Indians, and has been generally marked as 
the symbolic end of the many centuries long confrontations between the United 
States and Indian nations. In 1896, Frederick Jackson Turner famously wrote that 
 
(1841); United States v. Fernandez, 35 U.S. 303 (1836); Mitchel v. United States, 34 U.S. 711 (1835). 
Moreover, lower federal court judges repeatedly ignored Worcester. See SMITH, supra note 20, at 239–
40. 
165. Plan for Removing the Several Indian Tribes West of the Mississippi River, in 2 AMERICAN STATE 
PAPERS: INDIAN AFFAIRS 541, 544–47 (Walter Lowrie & Walter S. Franklin eds., Washington, Gales 
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167. See FREDERICK JACKSON TURNER, THE FRONTIER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 38 (Henry 
Holt & Co. 1921) (1920). 
